

# *Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs*

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Martha Graham, that connoisseur of bodies, and therefore someone who ought to know, is reported to have remarked that “the body never lies.”<sup>1</sup> But in that case, what truth does it speak? Let us begin with two stories. Both involve a woman and bodily resistance. One is pagan and “fictitious.” The other Christian and “true.”

## TWO SCENES

The first is a scenario from the popular milieu of the novel—more precisely from the second-century Greek romance entitled *Leukippê*.<sup>2</sup> The heroine of the novel, Leukippê, had once been a free woman, but at this point in the story has been reduced, by a series of conventional misfortunes (shipwreck, seizure by pirates), to the status of a slave. Her new

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1. Martha Graham, *Blood Memory* (New York-London: Doubleday, 1991), where the formulation “Movement never lies” is also found. She begins her memories with a telling observation that in such movement: “One becomes in some area an athlete of God.”

2. Achilles Tatius, *Leukippê*, 6.18–22; one of the more popular of the Greek novels (to judge from the quantity of surviving papyri in Egypt), it was probably written about the third quarter of the second century c.e. As with most ancient novelists, almost nothing certain is known of the author—he might have been a Greek writing from Alexandria. The text here is that of J.-P. Garnaud, *Achille Tatius d’Alexandrie: Le Roman de Leucippê et Clitophon* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1991).

owner, a vulgar brute bearing the appropriate name of Thersandros, falls in love with her. In order to have his imaginary dream of romantic love fulfilled, he requires her to respond to him as if she were a free person, one whose freely willed and volitional feelings for him will compliment the sentiments he has for her. He advances to her beginning with words, but then proceeds to physical touching: "As he talked with her, he placed his hand on her shoulder . . . he began to embrace her, moving forward to kiss her." Leukippê reacts physically by assuming a posture of bodily rejection: "seeing the course his hand was going to take, moving over her body, she bent her head forcefully downwards, resting it against her chest." She manipulates the longing gaze. By forcibly looking downwards and away from him, and by refusing to look into his eyes, she implicitly rejects the connecting moment when lovers' eyes meet and the most powerful emotional responses are set in motion. Thersandros, meeting resistance, responds with more forceful physical moves: "he encircles her neck even more with his arm, trying to compel her to lift up her face." But in response "she continues to hold her head bent down and tries to avoid his kisses . . . and some time is consumed in wrestling against the force of his hand." Thersandros then becomes more violent, escalating his use of physical force: "he puts his left hand beneath her face, while with the right he takes hold of her hair—jerking her head backward with the one, and pushing up under her chin with the other, he forces her to lift her head." But at the point where he is about to kiss her, the futility of what he is doing dawns on him. Which is to say that Leukippê's microphysical resistances have succeeded in transforming the scene from one of seduction to one of rape. With his volitional scenario effectively destroyed, Thersandros is forced to retreat in exasperation and to begin again afresh with a different script that will work. As this first series of physical confrontations is closed, Leukippê can resort, once again, to words. She can label the situation so as to make clear that the free action and the identification of autonomous self necessary to romantic love is absent from this relationship. "You are acting neither as a free man nor as a noble one" (*oute hōs eleutheros poieis, oute hōs eugenês*).

Thersandros' response is to redefine the relationship as one where he will no longer approach her within the frame of romantic love, but rather one of forced sex. She is his slave; he is her master. She will simply have to do what he requires. "Damned slave" he shouts at her and strikes her directly on the face. He shouts out that she should consider it a considerable piece of good fortune merely to be able to kiss him. Since she will not accept his wish scenario of free desire, she is therefore to have another forced on her: "Since you will not receive me as a lover, you will experience me as master." Leukippê herself then redefines Thersandros' new re-

lationship to her as that of the illegitimate domination of a totalitarian ruler: “If you choose to be a tyrant, then I must be tyrannized by you—but you will never win by force.” A bystander who is watching the encounter, one Sostratos (the pirate and slave-dealer who sold Leukippê to Thersandros) advises the liberal use of the whip to teach the woman who is lord and master. In reply to the threat of the direct use of violence on her body to compel her, Leukippê retorts:

Set out your instruments of torture. Bring out the wheel. Here are my arms—rack them out. Bring on you whips—here is my back, lash away. Bring out your swords—here is my neck, hack away. Bring on the fire. Here is my body—burn it. Feast your eyes on a new and marvelous sight—one woman, all alone, contends with all your many tortures and overcomes them all. . . .

The challenge is one that was being made by other women in the world of her own time.<sup>3</sup> Leukippê then compares Thersandros to a pirate and a bandit, the base anarchic powers of her world. He is worse than them—the illegitimacy of his power is marked by his inability to control his sexual impulses. If he cannot gratify his lust, he murders its object.

Take up all your instruments of torture, and at once; bring out against me the whips, the wheel, the fire, the sword. . . . I am naked, and alone, and a woman. But one shield and defense I have, which is my freedom, which cannot be struck down by whips, or cut by the sword, or burned by fire. My freedom is something I will not surrender—burn as you might, you will find that there is no fire hot enough to consume it.

The body itself is seen to embody identity/self/freedom and can itself be used to resist the final acts of violence imposed on it. The “I am” statements that conclude the brutal scene: “I am—naked, I am—alone, I am—a woman” (*egô de kai gymnê, kai monê, kai gynê*) are the quintessence of the identity problem that is at its heart, and, the power relationships that are inherent in it. The presentation of Leukippê, the fictional person in the world of the novelist, is that of a woman who recognizes that although her body is owned, she is not. Though a slave, it is her will or consent that is to be the final arbiter of the self.<sup>4</sup>

3. It is no mere coincidence that Simon Goldhill, “How Like a Woman,” ch. 3 (in *Foucault’s Virginité: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of Sexuality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 112–61, notes, at p. 117, that “Her speech to him [*viz.* Thersandros] is a masterpiece of impassioned self-defence that would fit well into a Christian martyr text.”

4. Primo Levi: “We are slaves, deprived of every right, exposed to every insult, condemned to certain death, but we still possess one power, and we must defend it with all our strength, for it is the last—the power to refuse our consent.” From *Survival in Auschwitz*, transl. Stuart Woolf of *Se questo è un uomo*, Turin, 1958 (New York: Macmillan, 1960/1993), 41.

The second story is the first in the surviving corpus of letters of the late fourth-century Christian ideologue Jerome.<sup>5</sup> It is cast in that rhetorical mixture of eroticism and outright pornography of which Jerome, a saint, was particularly capable.<sup>6</sup> About the year 370, in the Ligurian municipality of Vercellae at the foot of the Italian Alps, the Roman governor who was making the round of his judicial assizes was presented with a woman who had been accused of adultery. The accusation was false. Her husband (for his own reasons) had informed on her supposed involvement with a young man. To elicit the truth from him, the young man's body was subjected to a series of cruel tortures. As the "bloody hooks raked and lacerated his sides" he relented, confessed, and so, as Jerome describes it, "lied against his own body." The young woman was condemned by his lie and thus had no means of resistance left except that of her own body. She had to show herself to be stronger than the man whose body had just given up under the physical attacks upon it—she would be called upon to be "braver than her own sex."

As horrendous tortures were vented on her body, she had only her body left as a mode of resistance. It is seen as being in competition, pitted against the failed strength of the male body of her supposed lover, the adulterer, and tested against the bodily strength of the executioner himself. As a final, desperate stratagem, she could have some hope of reversing the normal map of power by exploiting her own body. In her world, those who ruled, adult male citizens who held formal power, were expected to exemplify an economical control of the self, a mastery over the slavery of the passions, a rule of the cool of the mind over the heat of the body—a special problem given prevalent views of the physiology of the male body. But the "feasting of the eyes" on the sight of her bodily resistance had the opposite effect on the governor. The woman's exertion of control over her own body, and its sustaining power, drove him to the frenzy of a wild animal. He fell into a fit of uncontrolled anger, became irrational and out of control in a public forum and thereby brought into

5. Jerome, *Ep.* 1 (CSEL 54.1–9). The letter displays some rather unusual rhetorical themes for Jerome; for an exploration of some of the possible contemporary contexts, see A. Chastagnol, "Le supplice inventé par Avidius Cassius: Remarques sur l'Histoire Auguste et la Lettre I de saint Jérôme," (in) *Bonner Historia-Augusta-Colloquium 1970* 5 *Antiquitas* Reihe 4 (Bonn: Habelt, 1972): 95–107.

6. Patricia Cox Miller, "The Blazing Body: Ascetic Desire in Jerome's Letter to Eustochium," *J ECS* 1 (1993): 21–45 [see ch. 8, "Jerome and His Dreams," (in) *Dreams in Late Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 205–31], is a good evocation of how Jerome's rhetoric is a "paradox wherein erotic sensibilities are both denied and intensified."

doubt his fitness to rule others.<sup>7</sup> The potential for this distortion, and hence its manipulation, even by near-dead and dying bodies, was commonly recognized: one could therefore exploit the spectacle of one's own suffering to overcome the self-control of the spectators.<sup>8</sup>

The "adulteress" finally reached a point where she felt, like the fictional heroine Leukippê, that she could openly challenge her torturers to do whatever they could to her: "strike me, burn me, cut me in pieces. I did not do it." She defeats her torturer with her body. "By this time the torturer was gasping and groaning. There was no place left to wound. His very savagery defeated, the torturer was horrified at the body which he had so mangled."<sup>9</sup> She wins the first round. The governor gives up in exasperation. But since the man, her putative lover, had confessed, that was enough for him—the woman must also be guilty of adultery. He sentenced them both to death. Once again, the young man's body proved routinely amenable to punishment—at the first stroke of the sword the head was severed from the rest of his body. The woman's body, however, proved miraculously resistant to steel.

The various attempts at executing her are cast in a pornography of power, of violent encounters between the male executioner's body and that of the woman. In a typical scenario of execution, forced to her knees she offers a quintessential female part, her throat, to the executioner's sword.<sup>10</sup>

7. Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 12, "the time worn polarity between 'male' self-control and its opposite, a convulsive violence, associated with a 'womanish' lack of self restraint," with some striking examples.

8. Plato, *Rep.* 439e–440a; and Augustine, *Conf.* 6.8 (13) are the classic instances.

9. Jerome, *Ep.* 1.6: "Caede, ure, lacera. Non feci." Again, it is hard not to see this bodily encounter between a woman and her male torturers as not being cast by Jerome in a covert erotic language; see Cox Miller, "The Blazing Body," 37–8, in the context of *Ep.* 125. The torturer, working away on her body, "gasps and groans," where the verb (*suspiro*) is also used in erotic contexts, as commonly in the lyric poetry of the late Republic: J. N. Adams, *The Latin Sexual Vocabulary* (London: Duckworth, 1982), 195, citing *Juv. Sat.* 6.37, *Tib.* 1.8.37, *Petr. Sat.* 87.8, *Lucret.* 4.1192 (*suspirat*) and *Anth.Lat.* 253.18 (*suspiria*), to which one might add, e.g., graffiti from Pompeii: *CIL*, iv, 4342: "suspirium puellarum tr(aex) Celadus."

10. On the throat, "the other mouth," as the vulnerable part of the woman, see N. Loraux, "Regions of the Body," ch. 3 (in *Tragic Ways of Killing a Woman*, transl. A. Forster (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 49–65 [*Façons tragiques de tuer une femme*, Paris, 1985]). G. Sissa, *Greek Virginity*, transl. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 48 f. [*Le corps virginal*, Paris: Vrin, 1987, 70 f.]; A. E. Hanson, "The Medical Writers' Woman," ch. 9 (in) D. M. Halperin, J. J. Winkler and F. I. Zeitlin, eds., *Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 309–38, at pp. 325–27.

His several attacks on her body with his “sword” are likened to repeated sexual “drives” (*impetus*) into her body.<sup>11</sup> At the first his sword merely “touches her body” and “draws a little blood.” The man prepares himself for a second attack but his “sword” becomes “limp” (*languidus*) and falls “harmless” on her neck.<sup>12</sup> Now he is panting and gasping and in preparing his third thrust he throws aside his cloak so that he will be able to use “all his power.” He places his sword right to her throat so that, with the pressure of his hand, he could force it into her body. But the sword instead of proving to be sufficiently hard “bent back on its hilt.”<sup>13</sup> He fails.

In describing all of these assaults, Jerome uses a language and an imagery that hints, and not too subtly, at the most obscene and insulting physical and sexual assault that could be made on anyone’s body.<sup>14</sup> In the second attempt to execute her, a newly appointed executioner takes three more thrusts to achieve his mission, strikes that apparently kill her. The executioner departs, but the supposedly dead woman miraculously clings to life. Her “corpse” is exchanged for that of an old woman who has just died. Taken off into hiding, she has her hair cut short and is dressed in a man’s clothing. The virile woman. Her body has, in the end, triumphed over the attacks of the strongest of men. The whole tale is replete with discourses of power that flow through her body, and which are clearly understood to have political significance. They question not only the authority of the delating husband, but also that of the governor, and, finally, of the whole authority structure of the empire. Jerome closes his account by quoting a few words (no doubt of oral origin) from Terence’s play *The Self-Torturer* that had become a popular exclamation: “How true is it that complete legality is complete injustice.”<sup>15</sup>

11. *Gladius* (and other sharp weapons) frequently for the penis: Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 20–21, 219; for *ictus* and *impetus* for the male “drive” or “attack” on the body of the woman in intercourse, *ibid.*, 148–9 and 159.

12. *Languidus/languo* for the flaccid penis: see Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 46 f.

13. *Capulus* can mean either the hilt of a sword or the *membrum virile*: Plaut. *Cas.* 5.2.29; *Auct. Priap.* 24.7; cf. A. Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 122.

14. That is to say, Jerome’s words and images all have strong sexual connotations; on *irrumatio*, see Richlin, *Garden of Priapus*, 149–50; and her, “The Meaning of *Ir-rumare* in Catullus and Martial,” *CPh* 76 (1981): 40–46; Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 125–30

15. Terence, *Heauton Timoroumenos*, 796: ‘O vere, ius summum, summa malitia.’

## A MODEL

These stories have embedded in them paradigms of how to confront power in situations where silent scripts, both individual and collective, become public.<sup>16</sup> Such a point is reached when individuals or communities are driven beyond the point of any endurance, where their fundamental elements of identity are publicly questioned precisely in order to be effaced, and there are, so to speak, no options left except to die in silence or, in death itself to express some type of opposition to the imposition of overwhelming force. A classic instance, and certainly one critical to the later development of Judaism, and therefore Christianity, was the Jewish resistance to Syrian domination in the decades after 168/67 b.c.e. The overpowering tyrannical force used by Syrian rulers and their agents to compel an unconditional cultural surrender was central to later literary remembrances of the confrontation. The conflict was evoked in individual theatrical pieces in which the subjects were left with the nil choice of either denying the very essence of their identity or accepting death. The later scripting of this encounter in written narratives became rather elaborate fictions, all the more so since the image of collective ethnic resistance had simultaneously to confront the ugly facts about important and powerful members of the indigenous community who did not see strict tradition as particularly worthwhile—about those who, in a word, collaborated.<sup>17</sup> But the Maccabean accounts of opposition to foreign domination and of the direct challenge to one sort of identity nevertheless provide us with a classic instance of a public “no”—the open rejection of a ritualistic litmus test of types of sacrifice and publicly performed ceremonials that constituted an essential surrender of community and the self. The the-

16. James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1990); cf. F. Crespi, *Social Action and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 95 f. For a parallel analysis of the conscious manipulation of public values in the service of a “hidden transcript”: B. D. Shaw, “African Christianity: Disputes, Definitions, and ‘Donatists,’” (in) M. R. Green-shields and T. A. Robinson, eds., *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religious Movements: Discipline and Dissent* (Lewiston-Queenston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 4–34.

17. D. Mendels, *The Rise and Fall of Jewish Nationalism: Jewish and Christian Ethnicity in Ancient Palestine* (New York-London: Doubleday-Anchor, 1992), chs. 1–3; the later scripting of this confrontation varies from the one in I Maccabees that emphasizes the polarity of external threat and internal social unity, together with the heroic actions of a single individual (Mattathias at Modin), to the complex and murky picture in II Maccabees in which the external threat is ancillary to an internal culture-war, where the deeds of the Maccabean family are peripheral to diversely striking and exemplary episodes of heroic resistance (Eleazar, the Mother and her Seven Sons, Razi).

atrical confrontations between brutal foreign overlords and recalcitrant subjects so vividly inscribed in the books of the Maccabees provided character-like archetypes of how to use one's body when there was no further possibility of resistance. The body was at the epicenter of this form of public display since, in order to make one's point, one had to accept the high probability of its obliteration.

The moral and philosophical treatises, histories, and various other literary forms generated by the Maccabean resistance reached a rather complex mix by the first century b.c.e. But the peculiar form, and document, with which I am concerned here, however, probably dates to the late first century c.e., and is therefore of particular relevance to the ideologies of the emergent Jewish sect of the Christians.<sup>18</sup> Fourth Maccabees is an extraordinary contemplation of the significances of body, soul and mind, sexuality, death, punishment and resistance. In formulating his protocols of refusal the writer of Fourth Maccabees was able to draw on the elaborate formal ideologies of resistance that had been developed by the élites of the Graeco-Roman world in their encounters with tyrannical forms of rule. The repertoire included typecast stories of individual resistance under extreme physical punishment, such as the story of the female prostitute who, being tortured by a tyrant, bit off her own tongue and spat it in her torturer's face as a symbolic "final word."<sup>19</sup> But the overriding ideology that the writer systematically appropriates was less that of exem-

18. As with most of the so-called pseudepigraphic texts, this one is difficult to date. Elias Bickermann, "The Date of Fourth Maccabees," *Louis Ginsberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, 1945), 105–12 5 *Studies in Jewish and Christian History*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 275–81, placed it specifically in the period when he believed Cilicia was joined to Syria as a common Roman province (between c.e. 19–54). A precise date for the treatise is probably not possible to determine based on the internal evidence alone (which is all that we have). So long as it is located in the period of the first centuries c.e., that is sufficient for my purposes, since I am not arguing for any direct causal links between the ideology in Fourth Maccabees and those expressed in other texts, but rather that they are being generated out of common problematical concerns. Most current opinion argues (rather more convincing in my view) that Bickermann's arguments cannot hold and that, based on stylistic, and other, considerations, the treatise is likely to date to around 100 c.e.: J. W. van Henten, "Datierung und Herkunft des Vierten Makkabäerbuchs," (in) J. W. van Henten, H. J. de Jonge, P. T. van Rooden, and J. W. Wesselius, *Tradition and Re-Interpretation in Jewish and Early Christian Literature: Essays in Honour of Jürgen C. H. Lebram* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 137–49.

19. Tert. *Apol.* 50.7–8, at the end of a long list of non-Christian philosophical martyrs, but which begins with the statement that Christians, in controlling their own self-identification, control their own destiny. The exemplary tale was renowned. Pliny (NH 7.23.87) retells it under the heading of "patientia corporis," calling the case of Leæna the prostitute (*meretrix*) the most renowned of all cases amongst women (*clarissimum in feminis*).

plary popular stories than the more subtle naturalistic legitimation of Stoicism.<sup>20</sup>

In his borrowings, the author of Fourth Maccabees sought to link several elements in the body/identity/power matrix, but to do this in such a way as to draw on existing orthodox ideologies on those subjects for his own purposes. The most obvious of these is the relationship between deliberate rational reasoning (*philosophôtatos logos*) and the body, its feelings, drives, sentiments—in short the passions (*hoi pathoi*).<sup>21</sup> The main point is that one can be Master of Oneself (*autodespotos*) by using mind and logical powers to control the body. In short, a sort of Stoic philosophy writ small for everyone—a conception restated again and again throughout the treatise as its basic theme.<sup>22</sup> In a treatise directed to the control of the body under punishment and torture, it is perhaps interesting to note that this self-moderation is exemplified by the story of Joseph the wise man (*ho sôphôn*) who through mental effort (*dianoia*) was able to control his drives to sensual pleasure (*hêdupateiaî*), an achievement which is seen as all the more remarkable because he was a young man who was at the height of his drive to sexual intercourse (*neos gar ôn kai akmazôn pros synousiasmon*).<sup>23</sup> The message is reiterated repeatedly in the rhetoric of Fourth Maccabees: knowledge and logic enable one to control the body's driving forces so that one does not become subject to the body—a slave to one's passions, and so to others.<sup>24</sup> The mind can overcome not only hedonistic pleasures, but also sensations of pain and suffering experienced by the body.<sup>25</sup>

20. B. D. Shaw, "The Divine Economy: Stoicism as Ideology," *Latomus* 64 (1985): 16–54.

21. M. Nussbaum, "The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions," ch. 10 (in) *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 359–401 [*Apeiron* 20 (1987): 129–77], explains the "hard line" Stoic position, which came to be modified by the later Stoics who aimed at "control" rather than "extermination"; see also D. C. Aune, "Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity," (in) W. E. Helleman, ed., *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), 125–58.

22. M. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2, *The Use of Pleasure*, transl. R. Hurley (New York: Random House, 1990), esp. introduction, ch. 3, and pt. I and II; and *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3: *The Care of the Self*, transl. R. Hurley (New York: Random House, 1986), pt. 2.

23. IV Macc 2.1–6.

24. IV Macc 3.1–3.

25. IV Macc 3.17; and, to an extent perhaps unusual in some Stoic sources, the author of IV Macc (1.20–27) dichotomizes the *pathoi* into the duality of pleasure and pain: see Aune, "Mastery of the Passions," 134 f.

The second appeal is to existing ideological norms of positive social valuation, especially to ideals of the body derived from contexts of its conscious control and visual deployment—above all, that of the quintessential public display of personal worth through the body: the athletic contest or *agôn*. By recounting in lurid detail the horrible tortures inflicted on the bodies of Eleazar, and the seven young men, and finally, their mother, the author of Fourth Maccabees places their confrontation with political tyranny within the framework of an athletic contest. He always presumes an audience of onlookers, and assumes that the spectators will be hostile. The point is to deploy one's body so as to change the assumed rules of the game—they are there, voyeuristically, both to enjoy the spectacle of punishment and to see it as underwriting their values: they order; you obey. They are there to witness the final display of violent power over subject bodies. They are also present to witness the production of a truth—the tortured subject will confess (*homologeîn*—a good Stoic conception) the necessary words and will agree to perform the required public ritualistic acts of assent. But the subjects of torture can resist with their bodies so that all three propositions will be defeated.

The tortured can view the confrontation, however unequal, as a contest (*agôn*) between their body and those of the torturers and spectators. The active agents of domination can be forced to be amazed, to wonder (*thaumazeîn*) at the ability of the tortured body to defeat all the punishments inflicted upon it. Having that sort of control over one's own body enables the tortured to be silent, to speak through their bodies, and thus *not* to speak the required words. It is, rather, the spectators who will be forced to confess: to admit their defeat and to confess the superior power of the tortured body. A precise parallel is drawn with the thoroughly prepared and trained athlete: if one holds out long enough, one wins. The victim of torture then acquires the greatest value attributed to persons of high social status in this world: they are ennobled, imbued with an aura of aristocratic demeanor—the type of inherent excellence reserved by nature for the ruling élite, but one which could be acquired by a victorious athlete through the exercise of his body.

More significant than all of this is a novel value that is enshrined in Fourth Maccabees as not just any value worth acquiring, but the pre-eminent excellence that is hypostatized above all others—the one that is vaunted as the operative guide of how to behave under extreme duress. This was the sheer ability of the body to resist, to endure the application of any force to it: “endurance” or *hypomonê* (ὑπομονή). Sheer *endurance* was now lauded both as a behavioral practice and as a high moral ideal. So the spectators are not only amazed and wonder at the courage and

manliness (*andreia*) of the Maccabean martyrs—that was quite traditional—but also at their simple ability to endure (their *hypomonē*). What is stated here is so ordinary that it might escape notice—so understated that it might be dismissed. It is a subtle part of a movement or shift that constitutes a moral revolution of sorts. Praises of active and aggressive values entailed in manliness (*andreia*) by almost all other writers in the world of the Maccabees could easily fill books. The elevation to prominence of the passive value of merely being able to endure would have struck most persons, certainly all those spectators, as contradictory and, indeed, rather immoral. A value like that cut right across the great divide that marked elite free-status male values and that informed everything about bodily behaviour from individual sexuality to collective warfare: voice, activity, aggression, closure, penetration, and the ability to inflict pain and suffering were lauded as emblematic of freedom, courage, and good. Silence, passivity, submissiveness, openness, suffering—the shame of allowing oneself to be wounded, to be penetrated, and of simply enduring all of that—were castigated as weak, womanish, slavish, and therefore morally bad.<sup>26</sup> The equation of these two virtues—nobility (*gennaia*) and passive endurance (*hypomonē*)—would have struck the classic male ideologue of the city state as contradictory, a moral oxymoron. But this was precisely the concatenation of values which the author of Fourth Maccabees wrote about quite explicitly, and which he vaunted and advocated as the ethic of primary importance to the body in the final, critical public scenes in which it would be required to participate.

All the values and behaviors that are embodied in Fourth Maccabees are summarized in its peroration:<sup>27</sup>

Truly divine was the contest in which they were engaged. On that day virtue was the umpire and the test to which they were put was a test of endurance. The prize for victory was incorruption in life without end. The first contestant was Eleazar, but the mother of the seven children also competed, as did the brothers themselves. The tyrant was the antagonist, and the world and all living men were the spectators. Piety won the victory and gave the crown of

26. So widely analyzed and commented on by now that it hardly needs reference. In addition to Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2, see J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York-London: RKP, 1990), chs. 1–2; D. M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality, and other Essays on Greek Love* (New York-London: RKP, 1990), chs. 3 and 5; and P. Veyne, “Homosexuality in Ancient Rome,” ch. 3 (in) P. Ariès and A. Béjin, eds., *Western Sexuality: Practice and Precept in Past and Present Times*, transl. A. Forster (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 14–35, for some classic, though perhaps overly schematic, formulations.

27. IV Macc 17.11–16.

victory to its own athletes. Who did not wonder at the athletes of divine law?  
Who were not amazed?

Therefore, the conscious production of a rather elaborate conception of passive resistance. Or perhaps, to put it more honestly, the explicit co-optation of passivity in resistance as a fully legitimized male quality—a choice that could be made by thinking, reasoning and logical men. That choice could be exercised in specific dramas of political legitimation in which, since the stakes were so high, the body itself was at the epicenter of its viability. It is therefore no accident that the extraordinarily strong ideologies that came to be attached to the body and its replacement came to fruition simultaneously with this practice. The conceptions of life after death and of the resurrection of the body are also precisely concurrent with the Maccabean rebellion.

The reworking of traditional thematic materials and the re-presentation of traditional stories at this same time in order to incorporate the new significance of endurance is evident in a number of other texts contemporary with Fourth Maccabees, amongst which the Testament of Joseph is probably the prime example.<sup>28</sup> The developmental cycle of conceptions, from self-control and sexuality to torture and punishment, and the centrality of *hypomonē*, is similar to that in Fourth Maccabees, but the message is made much more explicit. In his peroration to his assembled children, Joseph repeatedly refers to accusation, arrest, imprisonment, and punishment; and of being humiliated, threatened, made an object of fun, whipped, and kept under guard in prison. In all of these testings, he states, he endured “because perseverance (*makrothumia*) is a powerful medicine (*mega pharmakon*) and endurance (*hypomonē*) provides many good things.”<sup>29</sup> The rest of the monologue is an unremitting catalogue of an Egyptian woman’s unsuccessful attempts to compel Joseph to have sexual intercourse with her.<sup>30</sup> The first litany of such attempts (an alternating series of threats and enticements) is concluded by Joseph’s observation: “You see now, my children, what great things can be accomplished by en-

28. Text: M. de Jonge, ed., *Testamenta XII Patriarcharum* (in) A. M. Denis & M. de Jonge, eds., *Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graece* (Leiden: Brill, 1964), 67–79.

29. T. Jos. 2.7: ἐν δέκα πειρασμοῖς δόκιμόν με ἀνέδειξε, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἐμακροθύμησα· ὅτι μέγα φάρμακόν ἐστιν ἡ μακροθυμία, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ δίδωσιν ἡ ὑπομονή.

30. Goldhill, *Foucault’s Virginity*, 118 f., draws attention to the centrality of the theme in the novels, especially Heliodoros’ *Aethiopika* which has a plot very close to T. Jos. (though Goldhill prefers the parallels in the apocryphal acts of the Apostles, mainly those of Thekla and Paul).

durance (*hypomonē*) and prayer. You, too, can do this if you pursue self-control and purity along with endurance (*hypomonē*) and humbleness of heart.”<sup>31</sup> The second half of the text is devoted to yet another succession of attempts at sexual sieges on Joseph’s body, this time matched by even more savage beatings and tortures. Once again, the message is closed by an appeal to endurance—this time linked to the transcendent value of love or *agapē*: “You see now, my children, how many things I endured not to bring my brothers into disgrace. You should therefore love one another in patient endurance.”<sup>32</sup>

Perhaps the most remarkable text that dates to some time in this same penumbral age, however, is the Testament of Job. It is so thoroughly interstitial or liminal in ideas and composition that generations of scholars have been unable to agree whether the tract is “Jewish” or “Christian,” and they are equally undecided about a precise date and provenance. The work seems to be rather more Jewish than Christian in many of its basic themes, but in just as many of its novel aspects it seems closer to nascent Christian ideologies. Many dates have been proposed, but the most probable seems to be in the early second century.<sup>33</sup> Its importance for our inquiry is manifest. It is a treatise, which, although calqued on the canonical OT book of Job, is a rather novel composition that deals explicitly with the problem of endurance and suffering. Without laboring over the interesting details of this work, there are two features in it that are manifest and of interest to me. First, it is positioned in a group of works (along with Fourth Maccabees) that are explicitly devoted to the subject of endurance (*hypomonē*) as an autonomous conception. Then there are the rhetorical stratagems in which the problem is presented. These terms, I shall argue, reflect a manifest “feminization” of the text as compared to its canonical OT predecessor.

31. T. Jos. 10.1: “Ὁρατε οὖν, τέκνα μου, πόσα κατεργάζεται ἡ ὑπομονή, καὶ προσευχή μετὰ νηστείας. Καὶ ὑμεῖς οὖν, ἐὰν τὴν σωφρονσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀγνείαν μετέλθῃτε ἐν ὑπομονῇ καὶ ταπεινώσει καρδίας.

32. T. Jos. 17.1–2: “Ὁρᾶτε, τέκνα, πόσα ὑπέμεινα, ἵνα μὴ κατασχύνω τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς μου; Καὶ ὑμεῖς οὖν ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους· καὶ ἐν μακροθυμίαις συγκρούπετε ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐλλατόματα.

33. The text used is that edited by S. P. Brock, *Testamentum Iobi* (in) A. M. Denis and M. de Jonge, eds., *Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamenti Graece* (Leiden: Brill, 1967), 19–59. It seems almost certain that Tertullian used this text (or a variant from its tradition) in his *De Patientia*: 14.2–7, reflecting TJob 3.7–9; 14.2 5 TJob 1.5; 14.4 5 TJob 24.4, 25.20c. Therefore, TJob should probably be dated at or before the mid-second century. Word studies seem to suggest a date contemporary with the production of the later books of the New Testament—therefore in the decades right at the end of the first century or beginning of the second, see D. Rahnenführer, “Das Testament des Hiob und das Neue Testament,” *ZNTW* 62 (1971): 68–93.

At the beginning of the dialogue that is presented as his last will and testament, Job summons his children and reveals his identity to them: he is a man created wholly by endurance (*en pasê hypomonê genomenos*).<sup>34</sup> The context is one of proselytism, of Job's conversion to true belief and his destruction (with a gang of assistants) of a nearby temple of a false god. What is striking is not just that Job suffers for his conversion, but that his destruction of the temple involves him in combat with Satan and that his reward for victory is to receive the crown of victory and resurrection and eternal life. To which Job replies: "I will endure to death and will not retreat" (*achri thanatou hypomeinô*).<sup>35</sup> *Hypomonê* or endurance is Job's cardinal virtue.<sup>36</sup> His direct confrontation with Satan is met with precisely the same challenge that Christian martyrs were to make to their torturers: "Do whatever you will do. For if you wish to direct something against me, I am ready to withstand whatever you bring against me."<sup>37</sup> Job then explicitly compares his ability to display endurance under pain to a woman in childbirth: "I was not able to say a word. I was prone and exhausted—like a woman numbed in her pelvic region by the great number of birth pains."<sup>38</sup> The metaphor is set in a context where it is Job's body, not his mind, that is handed over to Satan to torture.<sup>39</sup>

But it is Job's wife who actually bears a major part of the narrative over the first half of his story. In contrast to the OT Book of Job, she is actually named as one Sitis. It is she who suffers the shame and degradation that result from the destruction of her husband's household. She is likened to a prostitute. Her head is shaven off in ritualistic punishment, and she

34. TJob 1: ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰμι ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν Ἰωβ ἐν πάσῃ ὑπομονῇ γενόμενος.

35. TJob 5: Ἄχρη θανάτου ὑπομείνω καὶ οὐ μὴ ἀναποδίσω; cf. II *Macc.* 14.44.

36. C. Haas, "Job's Perseverance in the Testament of Job," ch. 6 (in) M. A. Knibb and P. W. van der Horst, eds., *Studies in the Testament of Job* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 117–54, at pp. 117–18, noting that μακροθυμία (and parallel terms) and καρτερία (and parallels) are used as synonymous with ὑπομονή. What one is witnessing, in fact, is a usurpation of the former conception by the now increasing dominant one of patience.

37. TJob 7.13: Ὅ ποιεῖς ποιήσον. εἴ τι γὰρ βούλει ἀγάγαι μοι, ἔτοιμός εἰμι ὑποστήναι ἅπερ ἐπιφέρεις μοι. . . .

38. TJob 18.4: Καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνάμην φθέγξασθαι. ἠτονημένος γὰρ ἤμην ὡς γυνὴ παρεμμένη τὰς ὀσφύας ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ὀδίνων. Parallels with Qumran texts and the Psalms have been noted (see Haas, "Job's Perseverance," 123): "And I was confined like the woman about to bring forth at the time of her first child-bearing" (1QH 3.6 f.). This is significant since Job's wife is later compelled to admit (24.1–3) that her birth pains were all in vain.

39. TJob 20.2–3: καὶ ἀπελθὼν ἠτήσατο τὸ σῶμά μου παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου ἵνα ἐπενέγκῃ μοι πληγὴν. καὶ τότε παρέδωκέν με ὁ Κύριος εἰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ χρήσασθαι τῷ σώματι ὡς ἠβούλετο, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς μου οὐκ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὴν ἐξουσίαν.

is subjected to repeated public humiliation. Sitis, however, is not able to endure these attacks on her person, and accordingly has to be lectured by her husband Job: “If we have received good things from the hand of God, should we not in turn endure all evil things? Rather, let us be patient till the Lord, in pity, shows us mercy.” Matching the new significance attributed to Job’s wife, is the central role played by Job’s three daughters in the culminating episode of the text. Job’s daughters protest the distribution of all their father’s worldly goods to his sons. But Job reproves his daughters’ dismay when he bestows upon them a gift that he manifestly holds to be a much better and more important inheritance than the one he has given to his sons—the daughters receive special multicolored belts that are suffused with marvelous magical powers.<sup>40</sup>

Job persists in his grinding contest with Satan and finally produces a state of sheer exhaustion in his persecutor. Satan compares himself to an athlete, who even though he has the superior (literally, the upper) physical position, has been defeated by the one who is pinned underneath.<sup>41</sup> Hence the final words of Job to his children: “Now then, my children, you too must show patience in everything that happens to you, for endurance is better than anything.”<sup>42</sup> In the rhetorical formation of this text, with its obvious emphasis on passive suffering on one level, there is a not-too-covert feminization of the text that is coordinated with it on another level.<sup>43</sup> Not only does Job’s wife become a recognizable character who is central to the first part of the narrative, but his daughters are the main characters in which the whole story finds its end. The degree of the shift has been qualitatively, and quantitatively, observed. Quite apart from the anonymity and marginal reference to Job’s wife and daughters in the OT book, van der Horst notes that “not even 1 per cent of the verses of the book of Job speak of women, his wife and daughters . . . in contrast no fewer than 107 out of 388 verses in *T. Job* deal with women, i.e., almost

40. TJob 46–50, with a description of the marvellous effects on the girls when they put them on.

41. TJob 27.3–5.

42. TJob 17.7: νῦν οὖν, τέκνα μου, μακροθυμήσατε καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐν πάντι συμβαίνοντι ὑμῖν, ὅτι κρείττων ἐστὶν παντὸς ἡ μακροθυμία.

43. From this broader perspective, I am not concerned with debates over whether this image of women is meliorist or simply another variation of misogyny: see, e.g., S. R. Garrett, “The ‘Weaker Sex’ in the *Testament of Job*,” *JBL* 112 (1993): 55–70, as opposed to P. W. van der Horst, “Images of Women in the *Testament of Job*,” ch. 5 (in) M. A. Knibb and P. W. van der Horst, eds., *Studies on the Testament of Job* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 93–116. I am interested in the deployment of different gender types in the text itself and how this reflects, or reveals, changing emphases on fundamental values and how those values are tactically presented.

thirty times as much space as in the biblical book.”<sup>44</sup> The degree of shift, paralleling the increased emphasis on the mother of the seven sons in Fourth Maccabees as compared to Second Maccabees, must be deliberate and must reflect the desire of the author to develop the problem of patience by deploying a more “feminized” rhetoric.

#### A HISTORY OF ENDURANCE: LA NOUVELLE ÉCONOMIE DU SALUT

The texts of Fourth Maccabees, the Testament of Job and the Testament of Joseph are just indicators in a larger shift in values that comes into sharper focus in the penumbral age of the first century c.e.<sup>45</sup> The problematic issues of the time seek definition through the public rituals of trial and torture, come to be expressed in an explicit terminology of their own, and are consciously reflected upon in written texts.<sup>46</sup> The novel sentiments of these changes, however, cannot be read in isolation. They betoken a new role that could be thought about, and attributed to, the body. A noticeable tendency in the current application of Foucauldian precepts to the problem is to produce rather manichaeian models of male and female bodies, and of “maleness” and “femaleness.” But not even in the most refined of male ideologies in antiquity, that of the high Greek city-state or *polis*, whether in its philosophical discourses or in its technical medical treatises, was the male body (and therefore the problem of manliness or *andreia*) seen as a seamless whole constructed solely of male elements. Rather, from his very conception, and in his growth, the man and his manliness were constructed of both “male” and “female” constitutive materials, so that even the act of procreation of a new male body was, so to speak, a “crapshoot” as to which elements in the seed of either partner (the male or female elements in a man’s sperm) would predominate.<sup>47</sup>

44. Van der Horst, “Images of Women,” 94–95.

45. The phrase “la nouvelle économie du salut” is borrowed from Spicq “Υπομονή, Patientia,” 101 (no. 56 below): “Il rest à voir la place et le sens de l’υπομονή dans la nouvelle économie du salut,” referring to its new function in the New Testament and Pauline ideology of personal salvation.

46. I shall not be dealing with all instances; for overviews, see the standard encyclopaedic treatments by M. Spanneut, “Geduld,” *RAC* 9 (1976): 243–94; and F. Hauck, “Υπομονή, s.v. (μένω),” *TDNT* 4 (1942), 585–93 [Engl. transl. *TDNT* 4 (1967/1975), 574–88], who cites the earlier bibliography.

47. Hippok. *De Gen.* 6, 7.479 (Littré), see I. M. Lonie, *The Hippocratic Treatises “On Generation,” “On the Nature of the Child,” “Diseases IV”* (New York-Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), 3; for comment, see M. Gleason, “The Semiotics of Gender: Physiognomy and Self-Fashioning in the Second Century c.e.,” ch. 12 (in) D. M. Halperin,

So too a man's being consisted of various parts (tripartite in the classic Platonic formulation) where "lesser" bodily elements, including those of mind and soul, contained "weaker" feminine parts with which the man had to contend. But in this overall economy of the body the "lesser" virtues also had their necessary part to play—in the general definition, and defense, of the self these "less manly" virtues, such as the long-term power of simple endurance, were deemed just as important in any man's moral armament. That is to say, for the man, something as self-evidently contradictory to the quintessence of what he was to be—namely, the passive ability simply to stand in one's place and to "take it"—was thought to be as necessary for his survival as the "higher" male virtues of assertive and purposive action. The need for such unmanly virtues was admitted, but their denigration was simultaneously affirmed. In his extensive discussion of shame, Aristotle concluded that, "people feel shame when they suffer or have suffered things that contribute to dishonor . . . of which being physically violated is one . . . for submission and lack of resistance comes from effeminacy or cowardice."<sup>48</sup> No doubt, that is why the later Hellenistic collection of "Platonic definitions" had to report what was by then the common defense for such weak and inferior behavior when it had to be exhibited: if necessary, it *could* be justified in the name of the beautiful and the good.<sup>49</sup>

This hidden economy of the body resonates not so much in the publicly concerned writings of the city-state, especially those of its philosophical ideologues, as in texts marginal to its concerns, from epic and lyric poetry to the technical jargon of the doctors.<sup>50</sup> The polarization of ideals of the body engendered by the emergence of the politicized city-state constructed males as persons who had bodies that stood erect, inflicted pain, and died on the field of battle; female ones as suffering bodies, lying prone, giving birth in bed.<sup>51</sup> Conceptions of civic bodies were therefore attached

J. J. Winkler & F. I. Zeitlin, eds., *Before Sexuality*, 389–415, at pp. 390–91; and A. E. Hanson, "Conception, Gestation, and the Origin of Female Nature in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*," *Helios* 19 (1992): 31–71.

48. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.6.13: ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας γὰρ ἢ δειλίας ἢ ὑπομονὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι. Transl. George A. Kennedy, *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 145.

49. Ps.-Plat. *Horoi* 412c: καρτερία: ὑπομονὴ λύπης ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ: ὑπομονὴ πόνων ἔνικα τοῦ καλοῦ; cf. 412b: ἐγκράτεια: δύναμις ὑπομενωτικῆ λύπης.

50. N. Loraux, "L'opérateur féminin," (in) *Les expériences de Tirésias: Le féminin et l'homme grec* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 7–26 5 *The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man*, transl. P. Wissing (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3 f.

51. Loraux, "Le lit, la guerre," ch. 1 (in) *Les expériences de Tirésias*, 29–53 [from *L'Homme* 21 (1981): 37–67] 5 *The Experiences of Tiresias*, 23–43.

to specific barometers of pain and resistance.<sup>52</sup> The formal texts that paraded these dichotomies, however, barely disguised the trench warfare of continually disputed public meanings and aggravated inner doubts that accompanied them. Such an underground bodily economy, existing in the shadow of what was aggressively asserted and publicly vaunted, was a rather disturbing thing—especially since its values conflicted so much with the superior valuation placed on the male virtues of penetration, aggression, action, and domination. It was recognized that the conditions necessary for the demonstration of these were not always fulfilled either on the critical proving ground of andreic ideas and bodies, the battlefield, nor even within the body of the man himself. The internal struggle to maintain a corporeal entity that was under constant insidious micro-sieges required for its defense precisely those “lesser” feminine powers within the body. It took frank discussion, and a critical analysis that did not flinch from such undesirable and disturbing presences, to bring them into the open and force their recognition. But that led to a well-nigh unresolvable debate on just what manliness or *andreia* might be under conditions where bravery might mean doing nothing with your body except waiting, and sometimes not even with the “higher” manly knowledge of superior purpose. Not surprisingly, it was a debate that tended to resolve itself, as in Plato’s *Laches* (a dialogue on the definition of manliness and courage) in moral and epistemological gridlock.

Only on special occasions, therefore, could it be admitted, as in Perikles’ Funeral Oration on behalf of the Athenian war dead (430 b.c.e.), that those who had “lost” on the field of battle had, regardless of all other personal flaws and impediments, acquired the courage of real men (*andros aretê*). Whatever moral failings and wrongs had stained the private lives of these men, Perikles asserts, were now effaced by the good they had achieved by their death. They had endured and stood their ground with their bodies (*to d’ergon tō sōmati hypemeinan*) and so had arrived at the height of glory (*doxê*).<sup>53</sup> By basing their actions not on the shorter-term temporal values of social status, privilege and wealth, but rather on the hope (*elpis*) of a long-term communitarian value, they had overcome. But the suggestive ideas and sentiments implicit in this interpretation of death

52. Loraux, “En guise de conclusion: Le naturel féminin dans l’histoire,” (in) *Les expériences de Tirésias*, 290 [“La cité, l’historien, les femmes,” *Pallas* 32 (1985): 8–39] 5 *The Experiences of Tiresias*, 241, citing Plato, *Laws* 6.781.5—a rather revelatory text.

53. Thuc. 2.42.4; the precise relationship of actions to virtues, and the combination of these with exact political, material and ethical goals, is rather unclear, however, in this “perhaps the single most difficult sentence” in all of Thucydides.

remained adumbrated and embedded in far more dominant values. They were carefully defined, and confined, until Greek men were faced with the conscious recognition that they themselves were now inferior, weak, passive, and the victims of another's successful aggression. Then a Polybius could begin to explore a line (later to be more forcefully and consciously developed by Posidonios in tandem with the ideology of Stoicism) that victims who had been soundly defeated but who could still endure might also be able to win.<sup>54</sup> This was a long, slow, and sporadic emergence from its former confines of a revised perspective on the values of weakness and endurance—a revision that had direct implications for the modes in which gendered values and roles could be assessed and deployed.

What one sees reflected in texts like Fourth Maccabees, therefore, is the result of a progressive loosening of rigid gender categories from their anchoring in the social hierarchies of the polis. It was this distancing, the attachment of the body as a subject to a distant natural cosmos, that contributed to new valuations of the body itself.<sup>55</sup> The development of these new values could exploit a variety of existing moral discourses, including the traditional behaviour of a people that had learned the virtues of endurance, and expressed them in an ideology of hope and expectation of the future.<sup>56</sup> One typical manner in which these ideas were transferred to new cultural contexts was quite literally by translation. In the Alexandrian translation of the Tanakh into Greek the typical Hebrew terms indicating hope, expectation, suffering, and endurance were translated by the Greek verb *hypomenô*, and especially by its noun form, *hypomonê*. Whereas previously the verbal form had been almost the sole usage and it had been used to describe discrete actions or behaviors, the noun was now brought systematically into play to exalt “the thing itself” as a manifest and permanent ideal. It is in the Graeco-Judaic texts of the Hellenistic period, mainly in the so-called pseudepigrapha, that the abstract noun *hypomonê* first commonly appears as the specific designation of this elaborated virtue.<sup>57</sup> Reduced to its constituent elements, the bare word means “to remain underneath something” or “to lie beneath something.” It has

54. Polyb. 3.4.4–6.

55. Brown, *Body and Society*, esp. 26–35, on how the “Judaism” of the period posited a wholly different orientation of the mind-body duality within a cosmic monistic frame.

56. J. de Guibert, “Sur l’emploi d’ἐλπίς et de ses synonymes dans le nouveau testament,” *RevScRel* 4 (1913): 565–69; C. Spicq, “Ἰπομονή, Patientia,” *RSPT* 19 (1930): 95–106; and A. M. Festugière, “Ἰπομονή dans la tradition grecque,” *RevScRel* 21 (1931): 477–87, a subject greatly neglected since these early studies, it seems.

57. In addition to the *Testaments of Job* and *Joseph*, see, e.g., the so-called *Psalms of Solomon*.

strong connotations of proneness and hence of literal inferiority. Both, of course, had strong implications for a gendered discourse.<sup>58</sup>

The ideology is reflected in a flotsam of writings, mostly contemporary in time, including those by Jews in the Hellenistic diaspora like Philo who added Stoic conceptions to his Platonism in order to map the frontiers between that which could and could not be endured, the writings of the pseudo-Andronikos who wrote a whole treatise on the subject, and early Christian writers such as Clement (also from Alexandria) who recognized the links of “patience” with *karteria*.<sup>59</sup> When one considers the ideology of endurance in Philo, however, it is manifest that it is placed in a completely different field of meaning than the endurance of public torture which is our concern here. His deployment of *hypomonê* is allied to a struggle for self-perfection in which his main culture heroes are Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—all of whom exemplify varying types of self-moderation or sacrifice in order to better themselves spiritually. His prime examples of endurance in his own personal struggle to control his own passions included “suffering” the absence of friends and family when he went on a retreat into the wilderness, and “enduring” the hubbub of urban crowds and the pressures of extravagant dinner parties. In all these scenarios, *hypomonê* plays a marginal part in a story of almost purely personal concerns.<sup>60</sup> Despite the overlap of some terminology and borrowed philosophical concepts, Philo’s program could hardly be more different from that set himself by the author of Fourth Maccabees—a tract that contemplates direct confrontation with powerful rulers in public and which accepts the torture of the human body as *the* paradigm of the problem of suffering and the definition of the self.

These developments were part of large and shifting, and therefore contested, innovations in moral patterns within which *hypomonê* was to acquire great significance in Pauline and New Testament ideology. Rather early on endurance was recognized as a behaviour that could be cultivat-

58. E. Goffman, *Gender Advertisements* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 41.

59. Festugière, “Ἐπιμονή dans la tradition grecque,” 482–3; see Philo, *Leg. Alleg.* 1.65 and 67 5 von Arnim, *SVF*, iii, 263; *De Sept. et Fest. Dieb.* 2 5 von Arnim, *SVF*, iii, 286; Clem. *Strom.* 2.8; and the anonymous treatise ὁ προτρεπτικός εἰς ὑπομονήν.

60. Some of this is apparent in the evidence from Philo that Aune, “Mastery of the Passions,” 126–34, retails—but he does not catch the absolute schism between this world and that of IV Macc. The differences are much greater than the fact that Philo suggests that most persons cannot attain a state of *apatheia* whereas IV Macc suggests that “complete mastery over the passions is possible” (p. 139); on the systematic background, see M. Spanneut, “*Apatheia* ancienne, *apatheia* chrétienne: Ière partie, L’*apatheia* ancienne,” *ANRW* 2.36.7 (1994), 4641–4717.

ed and adopted to save oneself when faced by the forces of persecution.<sup>61</sup> Paul explicitly lauded the virtue of subservience in his model of marriage as a type of mutual servitude, and in his model of the family as a slave-like institution embedded in a cosmic servile system, with God as the master and with the believers as his slaves (or emancipated children). He could also link it, as did the author of Fourth Maccabees, to the agonistic model of the competitive disciplining of your body.<sup>62</sup> To endure punishment passively, especially where it was undeserved, was actually honorable when it was done for a good purpose: “You see, there is honor in enduring the pains of undeserved punishment, if it is done for the sake of God . . . the particular honor in the sight of God is enduring punishments patiently when you are being punished for having done what is right.”<sup>63</sup> Specifically linked, as it increasingly came to be, to the intensely defining civic experiences of trial and torture, the ideology was going to have a near-perfect theatrical venue provided by the Roman state for its deployment.

The connection between the witnessing of martyrdom and the virtue of endurance is made evident in the letters of Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, written during the course of his passage under arrest to Rome where he was to face execution in the arena. Ignatius had been condemned for “the name” and had been sentenced to die *ad bestias*. The conventional date is about c.e. 108.<sup>64</sup> The basic facts relating to Ignatius and the problem of martyrdom and body are manifest in his letters, especially that to the Romans. Most important is that Ignatius wished to die. Indeed, he explicitly states that “I desire (or ‘love’) to suffer.”<sup>65</sup> Throughout his letters Ignatius identifies the core virtue of endurance (*hypomonē*) as resulting from the type of self-training that an athlete or a gladiator undergoes in order to confront suffering.<sup>66</sup> Endurance is seen as the means by which the individual human being can withstand not just the actual tortures and

61. Luke 21.19; Spicq, “Ὑπομονή, Patientia,” 102, who cites Philip Legrance: “Le sens de ὑπομονή est l’endurance des persécutions. Si on cède, on perd la vie, si on résiste on l’acquiert, donc évidemment la vie éternelle.”

62. I Cor 9.24–27; again, appropriating existing values: V. C. Pfitzner, *Paul and the Agon Motif: Traditional Athletic Imagery in Pauline Literature*, SNT 16 (Leiden: Brill, 1967), esp. 23–37.

63. I Pet 2.18–20: the discourse is on the obedience of slaves to their masters; their endurance to unjust suffering is likened to the model of Christ. The whole letter is firmly set within a servile ideology.

64. Ign. *Eph.* 1.2–3.1 retails the basic facts of his conviction and sentence; the date of 108 is assigned his martyrdom in the chronicle of Eusebius.

65. Ign. *Trall.* 4.1, a frank statement: ἀγαπῶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ παθεῖν. . . .

66. Ign. *Eph.* 3.1.

bodily punishments of Roman executions in the arena, but also defeat the enemy who is identified with the Devil.<sup>67</sup> This *hypomonê* is parallel to the endurance and suffering which Jesus had, and which God now has for us as “sinners.”<sup>68</sup> Endurance is justified on the grounds of the achievement of a post-resurrection embodiment, a specific connection that leads Ignatius virulently to oppose docetic views of Christ’s body. In an almost pathetic manner, he protests that it is not possible for him to accept an ethereal disembodied view of Christ. Since it is Christ’s actual suffering in the body that establishes the mimetic model for martyrs like himself, to hold that Christ’s suffering was only a “thought experience” is unacceptable, indeed unthinkable. In Ignatius’ own words: “Why in that case would I pray to do battle with the wild beasts? If that were true, I would be dying in vain.”<sup>69</sup>

A meaningful death was the one thing that Ignatius was not willing to forfeit. Through the body Ignatius is able to link several images of suffering and endurance, but specifically that of a woman in childbirth to whom he compares the pains and sufferings endured by himself in order to achieve a new birth.<sup>70</sup> The topos of childbirth as an endurance of pain was an old one, but the hope engendered in it (if any) was the child born of the woman, not, as in Ignatius’ case, the literal rebirth of one’s own body. This specifically Christian type of endurance was then re-attached to the ability of the sufferer successfully to challenge the torturer, like the fictional woman Leukippê, to a duel of bodily strengths: “Let them come at me—fire and cross and contests with wild beasts, cutting and tearing me apart, racking my bones, mangling my limbs, crushing my whole body, cruel tortures of the Devil.”<sup>71</sup> Finally, in appealing to Paul’s classic definition of love as “that which is able to endure all,” Ignatius is able to re-connect these novel conceptions to God and to re-anchor them in a tra-

67. Ign. *Magn.* 1.1: ἐν ᾧ ὑπομένοντες τὴν πᾶσαν ἐπήρειαν τοῦ ἄρχοντος τοῦ αἰῶνος; *Trall.* 4.1: χρῆξω οὖν πραότητος, ἐν ἣ καταλύεται ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου. . . .

68. Ign. *Pol.* 3.1: μάλιστα δὲ ἔνεκεν θεοῦ πάντα ὑπομένειν ἡμᾶς δεῖ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς ὑπομείνῃ . . . (3.2) τὸν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δι’ ἡμᾶς ὑπομείναντα. . . .

69. Ign. *Trall.* 10: εἰ γὰρ, ὥσπερ ἄθεοι ὄντες, τουτέστιν ἄπιστοι, λέγουσιν τὸ δοκεῖν πεπονθῆναι αὐτόν, αὐτοὶ ὄντες τὸ δοκεῖν, ἐγὼ τί δέδεμαι; τί δὲ καὶ εὐχομαι θηριομαχῆσαι; δωρεὰν οὐκ ἀποθήσκω. ἄρα οὐκ καταναυέδομαι τοῦ κυρίου.

70. Ign. *Rom.* 6.1–2: ὁ τοκετός μοι ἐπικείται. The metaphor was already present in the NT: Acts 2.24: ὀδίνες τοῦ θανάτου; and again at Galatians 4.19: τέκνα μου, οὓς πάλιν ὀδίνω. . . .

71. Ign. *Rom.* 5.3: πῦρ καὶ σταυρὸς, θηρίων τε συστάσεις, ἀνατομαί, διαιρέσεις, σκορπισμοὶ ὀστέων, συγκοπαὶ μελῶν, ἄλεσμοὶ ὄλου τοῦ σώματος, κακαὶ κολάσεις τοῦ διαβόλου ἐπ’ ἐμὲ ἐρχέσθωσαν. . . .

ditional Jewish conception of a divinity who for the sake of the individual believer is able to “endure everything.”<sup>72</sup> The very conception of the divinity itself has thereby been almost imperceptibly altered and made to exalt the passive in His nature.

#### PATIENCE IN A ROMAN WORLD

By the end of the first century b.c.e., these words and ideas had sufficiently permeated the Roman world to allow a high-ranking man like Cicero to identify *hypomonê* with the Latin *patientia*.<sup>73</sup> In this strategic re-deployment one can find a conscious interweaving of elements derived from traditional Jewish and Hellenistic popular milieux, with those derived from the élitist ideologies of city-state and empire. In this dialectical process, Stoic ideology had a special place. It is no accident that Musonius Rufus could write deliberately about a woman’s ability to control her body just like that of a man, and thereby “to think of death not as an evil . . . and likewise not to shun hardship . . . so that it is likely that such a woman will be energetic and strong in the endurance of pain.” What is more, such a woman would “not be willing to submit to anything shameful because of fear of death or unwillingness to suffer hardship, and she would not be intimidated by anyone because he is of noble birth, powerful or wealthy—no, not even if he were the tyrant of her city.”<sup>74</sup> As an élite ideologue, Musonius read all of this backwards, so to speak. His women are able to possess and develop a faculty of courage “just like men,” but all this newfound “manliness” (*andreia*) of theirs is directed towards the quite traditional roles of being able to endure domestic housework and to protect the sexual honor of their household for their husbands’ sake. Still, it is significant that “womanly” courage and endurance are serious problems for him, and that feminine endurance and resolve were coming to be equated in some sense with the positive value of manliness.

Finally, extensive contemplations of the conceptions of endurance and patience came, by mid-century, to characterize the philosophical writings

72. Ign. *Smryn.* 9.2: ἀπόντα με καὶ παρόντα ἠγαπήσατε· ἀμείβοι ὑμῖν θεός, δι’ ὃν πάντα ὑπομένοντες αὐτοῦ τεύξεσθε.

73. Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 4.24.53, crediting Chrysippos (von Arnim, *SVF*, iii, 285).

74. Musonius Rufus 3–4; C. E. Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates,” *YCS* 10 (1947): 3–147, at 42–43. The verb ὑπομένω is used in both passages. It should be pointed out that Foucault substantially distorts the extent to which Musonius’ claims relapsed on, and underwrote, quite traditional roles and values: “The Wife,” pt. 5 (in *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3, 147–85).

of Seneca, a Roman who was almost the exact contemporary of Jesus and Paul (he was born perhaps a year or two after the former, and died by what was an imposed self-execution a few years before the latter was executed at Rome). Seneca discusses endurance and patience again and again, but primarily within the context of two species of bodily suffering and pain: illness (a personal affliction) and torture (a public misfortune). In fact, Seneca's repeated conscious discussion of the imminence and threat of torture are probably the first texts, and certainly first pre-Christian ones, to do so extensively. The most expansive and conscious deliberations on the nexus of pain, torture and endurance/patience are to be found in his philosophical letters. The literary form in which this discussion is borne, a vicarious form of diarization—one which took what was formerly a genre used for private communication as a mode for public discourse—is in itself highly significant. We might first consider a typical passage from one of the earlier letters in which he established a distance between one and one's body (one only has a sort of guardianship or *tutela* over it).<sup>75</sup> He then specifies three sorts of attack the body will have to endure: (i) want (e.g., hunger), (ii) sickness, and (iii) violence directed against it by stronger persons. Whereas (i) and (ii) are silent, it is the very publicity of the third threat (by which Seneca clearly envisages only torture) that makes it the most feared—because it is usually applied in the context of the uproar of a crowd and in front of public onlookers.<sup>76</sup>

The other evil [*viz.*, of torture, rather than natural illness] is a great public display. Surrounding it are swords and torches, chains and a fury of wild animals, which it sets loose on the disemboweled innards of humans. Imagine seeing in this place the prison, the crosses, the horses of torture (*eculei*), the metal claw, the stake driven right through the middle of a man until it protrudes through his mouth, limbs torn in opposite directions by chariot wheels, that infamous shirt laced and dipped with flammable substances—and other barbaric things that I have not mentioned. It is not surprising that our greatest fear is of this spectacle, the variety of whose instruments is so great and machinery of which is so terrible. Just as the torturer accomplishes

75. Sen. *Ep.* 14 (the specific argument here is from 14.1).

76. Sen. *Ep.* 14.4–6: *Ingens alterius mali pompa est; ferrum circa se et ignes habet et catenas et turbam ferarum, quam in viscera inmittat humana. Cogita hoc loco carcerem et cruces et eculeos et unicum et adactum per medium hominem, qui per os emergeret, stipitem et distracta in diversum actis curribus membra, illam tunicam alimentis ignium et inlitam et textam, et quicquid aliud praeter haec commenta saevitia est. Non est itaque morum, si maximus huius rei timor est cuius et varietas magna et apparatus terribilis est. Nam quemadmodum plus agit tortor, quo plura instrumenta doloris exposuit (specie enim vincuntur qui patientiae restitissent); ita ex iis quae animos nostros subigunt et domant plus proficiunt, quae habent quod ostendant.*

more, the more he displays his instruments of pain and suffering (indeed by show alone those who would have resisted him with endurance are beaten), in the same way, out of the range of things that subdue and domesticate our minds, those are most effective that have aspects which they can display.

In this passage, as in many others, Seneca explicitly speaks of endurance (*patientia*) as a means of resisting the inroads of torture on the body. But he recognizes the paradoxical nature of passive resistance as a virtue. Furthermore, the specific ways in which the apparent coherence with the martyrological texts is broken are several. First, Seneca ranks patience as a secondary virtue—one that only becomes apparent in conditions of adversity.<sup>77</sup> He further notes that it is a “feminine” virtue, comparing the virtue of endurance under torture to the joy acquired from enduring the pain of childbirth.<sup>78</sup>

In terms of difference, however, it is more significant to note that Seneca crafts his vivid descriptions of the afflictions vented on the body to support a forceful argument that we should assiduously shun dangerous situations that might threaten us with the imposition of these tortures. We ought to avoid provoking the powerful and not make ourselves an object of attention to those who might wish to harm us. The real danger is death. For Seneca, the linkage of patience with a transcendent value of a renewed body is blocked by the fact that the measured end, the *modus*, is a permanent physical end. Endurance and patience, therefore, have their own absolute physical limits. In an inversion of the Christian connection between patience and death compelled upon him by the “recoil effect” of that absolute limit, Seneca must assert that one will cease to fear when one ceases to hope.<sup>79</sup> The theme is picked up in another letter devoted to the subject (*Ep.* 66) in which Seneca, by setting up an imagined adversary, attempts to defend the passive virtue of endurance. He puts the question directly to his interlocutor: Does he consider that the manliness or bravery (*virtus*) of one who endures a siege with the greatest of endurance is the same as one who actively attacks an enemy emplacement?<sup>80</sup> The objection is that there must be some distinction between the pleasure (*gaudium*) of the latter and the condition of “unyielding endurance of pain.” Seneca’s counter is that there is no difference in substance; the only difference is in the way they are displayed or shown.

It is also important to understand the moral context in which Seneca

77. Sen. *Ep.* 66.36; 71.17.

78. Sen. *Ep.* 28.14.

79. Sen. *Ep.* 2.

80. Sen. *Ep.* 66.12: Quid? Tu non putas parem esse virtutem eius, qui obsidionem patientissime sustinet?

evaluates this virtue of endurance. He appeals to the cases of gladiators who killed themselves rather than suffer humiliation. It is a matter of honor, which is the highest measurement of virtue.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, mere endurance is not enough. It is the public face of such endurance that matters. In a letter ostensibly devoted to the problem of enduring illness (*Ep.* 67), most of Seneca's examples are in fact focused on the body under public torture. He makes the point that it is not mere endurance, but brave endurance that counts as a virtue. The problem for Seneca is that such bravery is seen by the dominant values of his time to be "womanish." The way he counters this is, once again, to deviate from his ostensible primary deployment of endurance in illness to the more striking cases of endurance by athletes and by those who are suffering political torture. First, he notes that although athletes endure enormous bodily punishment, they do not do so merely because they are fighting (he is clearly envisaging the martial contests) but in order that they might fight better. The distinction might seem picayune, but it does transfer the endurance from a passive to an active mode, and therefore removes from it the stigma of being "womanish": "Quid ergo? Non sentis si illum muliebritur tuleris?" Secondly, he compares the type of training one undergoes to fight better in an athletic contest to the active role that the passive sufferer can assume under torture. One can win by smiling as one experiences overwhelming pain; the more the torturer applies tortures, the more your body can actually challenge the torturer. One can speak with the refusal of silence.<sup>82</sup>

Even more [terrible and frightening] are the firebrands, the horse of torture (*eculeus*), the burning plates, and the instruments that re-open swollen wounds and which drive their tracks even deeper into the body. But there are men who have not uttered so much as a groan under these tortures. "It's not enough," [says the torturer]. The tortured man has made no request. "It's not enough." He has not spoken a word. "It's not enough."

In his frequent, if anguished, self-debates over the problem of torture, suffering, and patience, Seneca grapples with most of the critical elements of the novel ideology, but is resistant, as one would expect, to the final conquest of torture and death by a literal, renewed life-after-death and a bodily resurrection. His is a more mundane recognition of the hard physical limits or *modus* of a corporeal body and an equally corporeal spirit.

There is a second face to this movement in values that is not as evident in Seneca as elsewhere. The simultaneous rise to a position of predominance of the more conscious recognition of feminine or "weak" virtues

81. Sen. *Ep.* 70.8–9; 20–26 and 27

82. Sen. *Ep.* 78.15–19, at 19.

and the problematization of women in terms analogous to those usually set for men is found in a wide range of ideological writings between the Roman Musonius and the Greek Plutarch. The coincident fascination cannot be accidental.<sup>83</sup> The linkage also had connections with a new discourse on body that envisaged a spirituality that was more somatic, and which was therefore concerned with the experience of recurrent corporeal pain. The conscious deployment and extraction of the ideology, however, moved simultaneously along two lines. Firstly, certain elements of it were not absolutely new; there were indeed traditional strands of argument discernible in its development. But the isolation and elevation of passive power and resistance to a position of centrality in written texts, and the forging of one of the central pillars of moral guidance for men, required wholly new emphases and degrees of consciousness. The act of passivity became a deliberative action for men, a choice they could make; for women it remained, as it had always been, a constant role. They always had to practice endurance as a simple on-going role embedded in the experience of their daily life, including the not inconsequential aspect of having to meet domestic and social violence.<sup>84</sup> The crossover was provoked by the split “presentations of the self” in which men had one experience and women two.<sup>85</sup> As has been perceptively remarked upon, this new talk about the body is actually a discourse on a discourse: it is a way male writers could use the female body as a corporeal means of interpreting their world, including forms of resistance to it, and hence no different than the line of sight extending from the writer of Fourth Maccabees, through the novelist Achilles Tatius, to the saintly Jerome.<sup>86</sup>

83. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 3; with comments by Averil Cameron, “Redrawing the Map: Early Christian Territory after Foucault,” *JRS* 76 (1986): 266–71, who connects the increasing “privatization of public life” (leading to the concentration on the affective economy of the married couple, p. 267) with the ends of this new ideology: “The other side of a repressive discourse about women, and the limitation on and heightened self consciousness about one’s own [sc. male?] sexual practice, is of course to glorify a female figure who can be made to represent the ultimate in submission” (p. 270).

84. N. Scheper-Hughes, *Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in Brazil* (Berkeley-Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1992), with fine attention to the assumed roles of women.

85. In Scott’s terms (*Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 44), slaves, like women, have a strong experience of both public and private transcripts; cf. Winkler, “Double Consciousness in Sappho’s Lyrics,” ch. 6 (in) *The Constraints of Desire*, 162–87, esp. 174 f.

86. C. Bynum, “The Female Body and Religious Practice in the Later Middle Ages,” (in) M. Feher, R. Naddaff and N. Tazi, eds., *Fragments for a History of the Human Body*, vol. 1 (New York: Zone, 1989), 161–219, at 162, 165–66, 167–68.

By the turn of the second century in the Latin West, a comprehensive and coherent exposition of the new ideology of patience was capable of elucidation. This patience was integrally linked to a body image that, as the very word “passion” itself indicates, referred simultaneously to physical pain and to the physical sensations of erotic pleasure. Even the latter passion was not neutral in its meaning, but was heavily freighted as it went through shifts in erotic significances. Through the late Republic and early empire, the term “to suffer” when applied to the experience of sexual intercourse was very negative in its connotations, a negativity that represented a continuity of sexual valuations developed in the context of the classic Greek city-state.<sup>87</sup> It usually signified a man (the *pathicus*) who suffered or endured an aggressive sexual attack on his body, who was the passive recipient of intercourse and so was acting “like a woman.”<sup>88</sup> The behaviour of *patientia* or endurance was therefore rather bad, in fact one of the worst faults that could mark a man’s behaviour and character.<sup>89</sup>

The sexual sufferer or endurer, the *pathicus*, was an effeminate male, a traitor to his existence on two counts. The verb *sustinere* (“to sustain, to withstand”) was used to describe the patience with which his body had to accept a sexual assault on it.<sup>90</sup> In this same age, however, the virtue of patience (*patientia*) was one of the greatest that could be ascribed to a woman. It features prominently in the effusive praise of the virtues of his noble wife in the late Republic by her grateful husband.<sup>91</sup> Over the course of the first centuries of the empire, however, the noun *passio* (also derived from the same verb “to suffer”) came to have a positive valuation to refer to the “passionate” experience of heterosexual intercourse, where the

87. M. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), *passim*; note p. 4, n. 11, quoting Sen. *Con.* 10, praef. 10–11, for a pun on the name of one Passienus: “Ille Passieno prima eius syllaba in Graecum mutata obscenum nomen imposuit”; p. 82 for another striking example. In the Greek world the association of passive endurance (ὑπομονή, ὑπομένειν) is associated with condemnations of passivity in male homosexual acts in secular legal sources well into the Byzantine period, see *Ecloga* 17.38 5 L. Burgmann, ed., *Ecloga: Das Gesetzbuch Leons III. und Konstantinos V.* FBR, no. 10 (Frankfurt: Löwenklau, 1983), 238–39 (from the mid-eighth century C.E.); and S. Troianos, “Kirchliche und weltliche Rechtsquellen zur Homosexualität in Byzanz,” *JOByz* 39 (1989): 29–48.

88. Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 123, 133, 189–90, 223, 228; Richlin, *Garden of Priapus*, 92, 146, 202, 220–22. M. Gleason, “The Semiotics of Gender,” and the works noted in no. 26 above.

89. On the noun “patience” or “endurance,” see Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 190, citing Sen. *Quaest.Nat.* 1.16.6 and Petr. *Sat.* 9.6 (*muliebris patientiae*).

90. Adams, *Latin Sexual Vocabulary*, 192, on *inclino* (“to lie down, and take it.”) for pathic intercourse, citing the *SJuv.* 2.21: “inclinatum ad stuprum et sustinentem.”

91. In the so-called *Laudatio Turiae* 1.35, 2.21, 51, 66 and 69; see E. Ramage, *Athenaeum* 82 (1994): 341–70.

inferior role was properly played by a woman and in which the man experienced his rightful pleasure. This passion was good. In his writings, the Christian ideologue Tertullian commonly employed the word, and so was able to play on the dual meanings of *passio* as sexual pleasure in heterosexual intercourse and as the physical suffering of the body. In a parallel development, *patientia*, the endurance of suffering, was coming to have a positive rather than negative valuation.

A patience (*patientia*) that enclosed both suffering and endurance—the ability passively to hold out, often in the hope of better, became the cardinal virtue of Christians under threat. The ideology and its attendant novel terminology is strewn throughout the works of Tertullian, but is consciously and clearly explicated in a treatise he devoted to the subject: *De Patientia*.<sup>92</sup> In it Tertullian clearly distinguishes this endurance from the previous non-Christian sense of patience.<sup>93</sup> He envisages a striking image of this endurance as a feminine being. He imagines *patientia* as a woman in dress and deportment—demure, shy, withdrawn, passive—the *alumna* or foster child of god.<sup>94</sup> Tertullian accept that this was, indeed, not just a female, but also a servile virtue—the sort of behaviour and practice that was inculcated in slaves, and to which they became inured in showing due respect to their masters.<sup>95</sup> In explicating its specific meaning Tertullian was able to appeal to the charter of the Sermon on the Mount, where it was foretold that the poor and the weak would inherit the Kingdom of God.<sup>96</sup> Moreover, by linking it to the vision of patience in the Pauline charter which held that *love* is that which *is able to endure all*, Tertullian could merge the two senses of passion into a more coherent and logical whole.<sup>97</sup>

Patience or the simple ability to outlast the persecutor was also inextricably linked to the other “feminine” virtue of hope—hope for a better life, a divine promise of what was there for the patient, if only one could wait. This quasi-millennial expectation gave a larger, more-than-personal element to Christian endurance. It was the new body that would benefit from a reversal of present conditions. No pain, no suffering: the body would become impatient. The Apocalypse of John envisages this tran-

92. CSEL 76.140 f. 5 CCL 1.319 f., usually dated to 198–203.

93. Tert. *Pat.* 16, esp. 16.1.

94. Tert. *Pat.* 15.

95. Tert. *Pat.* 4.1–4.

96. Tert. *Pat.* 11.5–9; that is to say, the emergence of a hidden transcript ideology of “the poor” that espoused different values and aspirations from those of the elite ideology.

97. Tert. *Pat.* 12.9–10; see I Cor 13.4–13.

scendent state when “he will wipe away every tear from their eyes, there shall be no more death, no more grief, crying, or pain—for those earlier things will have passed away.”<sup>98</sup> These linkages—a patience grounded in endurance, a transcendent paradise, death, and hope—were consciously enunciated in the generation before Tertullian in the word attributed to the martyr Justin.<sup>99</sup> Tertullian argues that this *patientia* or endurance is of supreme importance to mind and body—it is through it that one becomes the lord and master of one’s body. The twin disciplines that are needed are those of control of food (diet) and then the higher and more difficult control of sexual desires.<sup>100</sup> Thus prepared, the body can battle against persecutors, can bear up under the harshness of imprisonment, of beatings and chains. Nothing more than sheer endurance of the body is required, he claims, to experience the blissful happiness of the second baptism. When one is master of one’s body through patience, then one can hold out against every physical threat directed against it—whips, fire, the cross, wild beasts and . . . the sword.<sup>101</sup>

The ideology became increasingly formalized in the mid-third century in the midst of the first systematic empire-wide persecutions of Christians ordered by the emperors Decius and Valerian. The course of these attacks on bodies (more powerful and thorough than earlier, sporadic efforts) concomitantly empowered martyrs and confessors on a new scale—one that openly threatened their hierarchy of public ecclesiastical power. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, himself martyred at the end of this renewed persecution (in 258) delivered a monitory talk on the new problems. It was entitled “On the Good of Endurance” (*De bono patientiae*).<sup>102</sup> Cyprian was under considerable pressure to define a role for the body in this power struggle—to constrain it to acceptable ends in terms of a Christian ecclesiology and, simultaneously, to maintain and harness its pres-

98. Rev 7.17; and esp. 21.1–4, beginning “Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth.”

99. Justin was asked by Rusticus, the *Praefectus Urbis*: “If you are whipped and then beheaded, do you believe that you are going to ascend to heaven?” Justin’s reply is (Rec.A 5.2): Ἐλπίζω ἐκτῆς ὑπομονῆς εἰς ἀνὸς ἀπομεῖνω. (Rec.B 5.2 has much the same wording); see no. 4 (in) G. Krüger & G. Ruhbach, eds., *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten*<sup>4</sup> (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Paul Siebeck, 1965), 15–18, at § 5.2 (p. 17).

100. Tert. *Pat.* 13, on a crudely corporeal control—echoing Pauline themes.

101. Tert. *Pat.* 13.8.

102. Cyprian, *De bono patientiae* (CSEL 3.3), 397–415; J. Molager, ed., *Cyprien de Carthage: A Donat [et] La Vertu de Patience*, SC 291 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1982); composed towards 255, and under the influence of Tertullian’s ideas. In comment, see M. Spanneut, “Patience et temps chez saint Cyprien de Carthage,” (in) *Littérature et Religion: Mélanges offerts à M. le Chanoine Joseph Copin* 5 *Mélanges de science religieuse*, suppl. vol. 23 (Lille, 1966), 7–11.

ence to confront the real threat of persecution. Cyprian addressed his parishioners in a repetitious and hammering verbal assault. Christian endurance, he argued, must be distinguished from the false patience of the philosophers. Their endurance is displayed for the virtue of the self, whereas “ours,” asserts Cyprian, is marked by humility and softness. Christian endurance was self-abnegating to the point of slavishness since in fact “we *are* the sons and slaves of *the* father and *the* lord.”<sup>103</sup>

Cyprian’s patience is partially modeled on (and contributes to) a typology offered by Christ who always “offered the other cheek” and who endured all physical insults to his body. In Cyprian’s ideological reconstruction, however, the voice of woman is systematically “read out” of the explanation. It is the patriarchs who were the progenitors of the Christian ideal. The *vox muliebris* is introduced to the argument only to explain how and why endurance had to become the normal mode of all human existence.<sup>104</sup> It is at this point in his argument that Cyprian introduces the second motif of Christian patience: the ability of the persecuted to endure not only the present attacks on them, but also to wait both for the better life that awaited them—and also for revenge.<sup>105</sup> For those who are patient the day will come, he promises, when the great judge will return in anger and establish the final court in which he will mete out just punishment to all his enemies. The monotonous density of the text that presses home on virtually every other line the terms of endurance (*patior, patientia*), of bearing up (*sustinere, sustinentia*), and of suffering and forbearance (*toleror, tolerantia*), matches the force with which this patience had become the ideological and behavioral pivot of the Christian body.

Set against this Christian body were parallel developments in converging tendencies to explicating a common problem of body and power (though within distinct social nexus). Some of these other possibilities are perhaps best exemplified by the intense somatic contemplations of Aelius Aristides.<sup>106</sup> It is an ideology in which, as it has been put, “the emphasis on pain and suffering reflects a widespread cultural concern of the period that used representations of bodily pain and suffering to construct a new

103. Cypr. *Bon. pat.* 1–3.

104. Cypr. *Bon. pat.* 11, 18; beginning with the *vox mulieris tuae* (of Eve, of course).

105. Cypr. *Bon. pat.* 21–24.

106. J. Perkins, “The ‘Self’ as Sufferer,” *HTR* 85 (1992): 245–72 [“Ideology, not Pathology,” ch. 7 (in) *The Suffering Self: Pain and Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London-New York: RKP, 1995), 173–99]; to which, however, must be added the research of Danielle Gourevitch, “La maladie comme preuve d’existence: L’aventure d’Aelius Aristide et ses interprétations,” ch. 1.1 (in) *Le triangle hippocratique dans le monde gréco-romaine: Le malade, sa maladie et son médecin* (Paris-Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1984), 17–59.

subjectivity of the human person.”<sup>107</sup> The strong somatization of the dream messages dispatched to Aristides by his god, and meticulously recorded by himself in an immense diary, presents us with a manifest case of identity, a subjectivity, created around the suffering body. But the patient thus constructed marked a significant departure from the external civic definition of the man as self. Submission, suffering, and heroic endurance are now linked to a careful contemplation of one’s own body. The discourse in which Aristides is engaged, however, is distinctively his own, and is located in a realm ideas and rhetoric separate from that of the Christian ideologues. Not once does he express himself in the elaborate ideology (or attendant jargon) of *hypomonê* or its implicit political dimensions.<sup>108</sup> Never once does Aristides read the terms of his bodily argument back into the sphere of the “public transcript” where it might conceivably be used as leverage against a threatening public authority. On the contrary, his ideology seems only to signal a rather painful implosion inwards on the physical self.

### THE BODY

The increasing prominence of this particular discourse of the body, of active resistance through the patient body, is significant since its deployment was coterminous with a crisis impending on the Roman state. Since the problems were being contested in small settings in a myriad local social milieux, the degree of awareness that state officials had of them is uncertain. The confrontation, however, was a critical one that struck at the ideological foundations of the state’s social order. Such challenges had to be met with a finality in which the state publicly demonstrated its superior power by physically breaking the undesirable behaviour of recalcitrant subjects. Because of the way these trials and executions were staged, the body became central to demonstrations of power. A further reason has been noted:<sup>109</sup>

. . . at particular moments when there is within a society a crisis of belief—that is, when some central idea or ideology or cultural construct has ceased to elicit a population’s belief either because it is manifestly fictitious or because it has for some reason been divested of ordinary forms of substantiation—the

107. Perkins, “The ‘Self’ as Sufferer,” 246.

108. He simply does not use the technical vocabulary; this is allied to the observations, for example, of Perkins, “The ‘Self’ as Sufferer,” 255 f., on the place of bodily contemplation and the type of self that Aristides is constructing.

109. E. Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 14.

sheer material factualness of the human body will be borrowed to lend that cultural construct the aura of 'realness' and 'certainty.'

For those who came as spectators to this public drama, torture and the systematic rending of the body was needed to reveal the individual subject's feebleness, to exact a terrible public vengeance for non-compliance and to produce the truth.

The problem was that actual bodies were caught up on crisscrossing, and immensely contradictory discourses of power. The Roman state had its own, as did its local officials (mainly, in these cases, the provincial governors), as did local communities, and the various ethnic and class groups within them, and the persons who were Christians. Every trial was therefore a matter of fixing identities. Both identification and the attendant confession took the form of a series of "I am" statements. The protocol of any trial and interrogation began with the formal question of "Who are you?" and "What's your status?"<sup>110</sup> The permanent institutional venues within and through which these confrontations were to be played out were also various, disaggregated, and firmly embedded in local cultural environments. Therefore, a basic conclusion now widely conceded: for a long period, extending at least over a century and a half, incidents of persecution were sporadic, uncertain, haphazard and dispersed through odd local venues in the empire. It took a long time before the Roman state at state level arrived at the idea and practice of a general state-ordered persecution of the whole.<sup>111</sup> The power relationships that came into play in any given local instance were not uniform or wholly predictable. There therefore existed a considerable range of negotiation in what would actually happen—a situation of which Christians were well aware.

In writing a monitory letter in c.e. 212 to P. Julius Scapula, the Roman governor of Africa, Tertullian was already able to map out a range of known alternatives in the repertoire. He could catalogue past variations in confrontations between Christian defendants and provincial judges.

110. G. A. Bisbee, *Pre-Decian Acts of Martyrs and Commentarii* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988); e.g., the *Gesta apud Zenophilum*: "Quis vocaris?" "Cuius conditionis es?" "Cuius dignitas es?"—they are the standard questions meant to establish identity (CSEL 26.185–97, at p. 185); a scenario that was profoundly fixed in dream sequences of self-identification: see Jerome, *Ep.* 22.30.3–5 (CSEL 54.190–91) and no. 115 below.

111. T. D. Barnes, "Legislation Against the Christians," *JRS* 58 (1968): 32–50 5 ch. 2 (in) *Early Christianity and the Roman Empire* (London: Variorum, 1984): a turning point in our understanding of the structure and tempo of persecutions in the empire.

The governor could coach the defendant as to how to reply so as to make the case one that was legally dismissable. Or, since the governor was generally responsible for a larger law and order in the society as a whole, he could simply decide to dismiss the case on the basis that it was likely to cause a greater social disturbance than it was worth. Or, having already entered into a case and then sensing that he was needlessly becoming too deeply involved in complex local disputes, he might seek to divest himself of the problem—like the governor C. Iulius Asper who “having only moderately tortured a man, took him down from the instruments and did not compel him to sacrifice.” Asper confessed to his legal advisers that he was upset with himself that he had ever become involved in the case in the first place. Or the governor could resist local pressures by using the grounds of “a lack of proper procedures.” Thus after “shaking down” one defendant and having acquired some evidence from him, the governor dismissed the case, cutting short his initial statement of charges (*elogium*) on the basis that there was no formal accuser present and, according to his mandate, he would not proceed under such circumstances. The known spaces and possibilities for resistance in this social narrative, from point of arrest onwards, were therefore well known.<sup>112</sup> As long as Christians would not play their part governors always had to balance a whole set of countervailing pressures against any good that was likely to eventuate for them from their trial, torture, and execution.

We know that at least some Christians did not behave in public like the criminals they were supposed to be. Such criminal behavioral symptoms were well known and signaled in public by a pervasive body language of self-abasement: blushing, sweating, signs of fear and shame, shuffling, bowing, scraping, signs of repentance and remorse, weeping, and so on.<sup>113</sup> That was the behavior of persons who were convinced of their own guilt by the overpowering rituals of court and “awe of the law” with which they were faced. The Christians’ bodily symptoms, movements, and gestures, however, did not signal guilt but rather the reverse, and hence were an implicit condemnation of the whole system.<sup>114</sup> Indeed, the

112. Tert. *Scap.* 4.3 f.

113. Tert. *Apol.* 1.10–13, and his discussion the emotions of *timor*, *pudor*, *tergiversatio*, *paenitentia* and *deploratio* ordinarily displayed by accused persons.

114. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 203–06, on the distinction. Context would dictate whether these bodily acts would be interpreted as conscious and deliberate, and not an “accidental” miscue that could be overlooked by the authorities—but, in most cases, by the point they were fixed in the formal confrontation of a trial, it would be too late to overlook the all-too-obvious significance of public demeanor of this sort.

mere position of the body in space was important as a signifier of hierarchies of power. In the displays of trial and punishment, it was literally placed lower: the governor and his assistants, the judges, were seated on a high tribunal—the defendants were kept at ground level with the crowd of spectators and had to mount the stairs of a separate platform (*pulpitum, catasta*) in order to be brought to the level of the governor for questioning and sentencing. This prostration of the body signified in itself, and differentials of height between defendants and judges subliminally impressed itself even on consciously resisting Christians.<sup>115</sup>

That is to say, a physically lower position, having the body down, on its knees, or prone to the ground, was taken in itself to indicate servility and inferiority, weakness rather than power. Therefore, a physical position closer to the ground was implicitly regarded as being morally inferior and bad. The connection between bodily position and moral evaluation, and the revolution in values connected with valuing the inferior, the humble, the womanly, that which merely accepts and endures (from a prone position) is clearly indicated by the history of the words that were used to describe being low to the ground or prone—*tapeinos* and allied terms (meaning low, prone, close to the ground, and consistently associated with being poor, weak, insignificant, and womanly).<sup>116</sup> In this case (unlike the verbal debates over *hypomenein*) there was never any confusion or vacillation of an absolute frontier of meaning by the ideologues of the classical city-state and their heirs. The almost palpable association of moral status and bodily position was so strong and so inalterable that the classical conceptions that pervaded the thought-world of the Greek *polis* and all its successor ideologies surrendered no ground on this matter. To be *tapeinos* was to be weak, poor, submissive, slavish, womanish, and therefore had an indelible connection with shame, humiliation, degradation and, inexorably, with that which was morally bad. The words when used by the *LXX*, Philo, and Josephus never waver from these fundamental and basic meanings. It is the Christian writings of the New Testament that revolutionize these values wholly by their total inversion. Paul boasts of his self-abasement and humility, and draws attention to the ef-

115. Goffman, *Gender Advertisements*, 40. For dreams of Christian martyrs in which the height of the tribunal of the judge becomes an overpowering image, see the martyrdom of Marianus and Jacobus, no. 15 (in Krüger & Ruhbach, *Ausgewählte Märtyrerakten*<sup>1</sup>, 67–74, at ch. 6, pp. 69–70; cf. Jerome's dream, *Ep.* 22.30.3–5 (CSEL 54.190–91) for much the same effect.

116. H. Grundmann, "ταπεινός, ταπεινώω, ταπεινώσις, ταπεινόφρων, ταπεινοφρονσύνη," *TDNT* 8 (1972/1975), 1–26.

fort one must make to strive towards the final virtue that should be claimed by the Christian, that of being *tapeinos*. Indeed, he actually creates a new virtue—*tapeinosophrunê* (ταπεινοσοφρύνη)—the voluntary abasement of the self and one's body.<sup>117</sup> To be low, base, prone, and exposed was now at the heart of the definition of being good.

This takes us, full circle, to the scene of execution so vividly described by Jerome at the head of this paper and which systematically attached bodily position and location to the more general gender/erotic system of honor in his world. The condemned woman, on her knees, her hands tied behind her back and sword placed to throat, was to suffer not just the obliteration of her body, but simultaneously to enact a violent sexual metaphor. The man who held his sword at her throat, threatened her identity to assert his, ended her being to further his. This was not just an act of bare physical violence or coercion. It was also the sexual assertion of a social order. If this much is not guaranteed by Jerome's duplicitous words, it is revealed in scenarios of a more overtly erotic/violent nature found in the curse tablets and clay figurine "voodoo dolls" deployed by unrequited lovers of the time. One of these pieces is particularly disturbing to modern eyes, since it is shocking to turn the page of an academic book, or journal, to find oneself confronted with the figurine of a woman whose body is being cruelly pierced by no less than thirteen sharp bronze needles.<sup>118</sup> The librettos that accompanied such dolls makes clear the significance of the enactment of the same bodily positions, movements, and violence reported so pruriently by Jerome.<sup>119</sup>

Take wax [or clay] from a potter's wheel and make two figures, a male and a female. Make the male in the form of Ares fully armed, holding his sword in his left hand and threatening to plunge it into the right side of her throat. And make her with arms behind her back and down on her knees. . . .  
(296–303)

117. Elsewhere only in Epictetus 3.24.56.

118. P. du Bourguet, "Ensemble magique de la période romaine en Egypte?" *La Revue du Louvre* 25 (1975): 255–57, cf. the reproduction in J. Gager, *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), no. 27, pp. 94–97, and fig. 13, p. 98; the accompanying text: S. Kambitsis, "Une nouvelle tablette magique d'Egypte," *BIFAO* 76 (1976): 213–30 5 *SEG* 26, no. 1717. Two more figurines of this type have been noted subsequently: C. Faraone, "Binding and Burying the Forces of Evil: The Defensive Use of 'Voodoo Dolls' in Ancient Greece," *CA* 10 (1991): 165–205 (pls. 1–13, 206–220), p. 204, no. 27.

119. K. Preisendanz, ed., *Papyri Graecae Magicae: Die griechische Zauberpapyri*, 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1928), IV.296–466 (pp. 82–86) 5 H. D. Betz, tr., *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation, including the Demotic Spells* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 44–46.

The scene manages to mix threatened violence, execution and a stream of *double entendres* hinting at *fellatio/irrumatio*.<sup>120</sup> What follows is, quite literally, writing on the body as the man who is seeking to control the woman writes fabulous and threatening curses on each part of her anatomy—including, above all, her name and her mother's name on her breasts. Fearsome demonic forces of the night and underworld are summoned. The woman is to be compelled, bound, forced and driven. She is to be cut off sexually from any other:

Let her be in love with me, 'x,' whom she, 'x,' bore. Let her not be had in a promiscuous way, let her not be had in the ass, nor let her do anything with any other man for pleasure, just with me alone. . . . (351–53)

The parallels with Jerome's vignette follow as we discover that what is being encouraged is adultery. To this end, violent force is to be used:

. . . do not allow her, 'x,' to accept for pleasure the attempt of another man, not even that of her own husband, just that of mine, 'x.' Instead, drag her, 'x,' by the hair, by her heart, by her soul, to me, 'x,' at every hour of life, day and night, until she comes to me, 'x,' and may she, 'x,' remain inseparable from me. Do this, bind her for all the time of my life and help force her, 'x,' to be serviceable to me. (375–83)

The homologies with the physical attitudes of humiliation required by a Roman execution are obvious. It is the deliberate placing of the body in a position from which, as it has been noted, it is almost impossible to defend oneself. The parallels then run through body position, femininity, subordination, and control.<sup>121</sup> Therein lay the specific continuities in the new economy of the body that were to be embedded at the center, somewhat ironically, by Christian ideologues and those martyrs who exemplified the new practice. But, perhaps not so ironically, it took place in the

120. The standard English translation tends to disguise the double signification. By holding the "sword," quite unusually, in his left hand, the armed man makes clear one of his intentions—not the hand in which one usually held the weapon of armor, but rather that of life (the left also signifying bad luck and ill omen); the verb *καταπλάσσω* signifies an attempt to bully and terrorize as much as actually to strike someone; the noun *κατακλείς* *can* mean the clavicular bone or that part of the neck, but most often it signifies a sheathed receptacle for a pointed object (a key, a bolt, a pin, an arrow or a dagger); for other parallels, see J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1975; reprint: 1993), 130 f., esp. nos. 140 f.; as a receptacle for a key, see Aristoph. *Vesp.* 154; as a woman's neck or throat region: II Macc 3.19.

121. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire*, 93–4, exculpates these "protocols" from representing a not-too-covert sexual violence involving women.

theater of the national pornography of the Roman state—its public executions. Here the rending of flesh in public could be linked to the bravery exemplified by a woman in her confrontation with Roman authority and, simultaneously, to a language of love.<sup>122</sup> So the whole of the story of the young Spanish girl Eulalia, as re-created by Prudentius, is embedded in explicit erotic contexts.<sup>123</sup> As the iron hooks of the executioners rake across and through her breasts, it is Eulalia (she who “speaks well”) who notes the marks made by them as a species of writing on her body.<sup>124</sup> She counts the letters (*notas*) as they appear on her body, and utters the words:<sup>125</sup>

See, my lord, you are writing on me.  
How I love to read these letters  
which, my Christ, record your triumphs.  
The dark scarlet of my blood pouring out  
speaks your holy name.

In ordinary discourse, to have one’s body written on was in itself a sign of inferiority. To have a name inscribed on one’s body was a sign of servility—a visible mark of the ownership of one’s self by another. But the language of love could reverse the meaning.<sup>126</sup>

122. Her story begins with a planned, then rejected, marriage and then advances to her arrest, torture, and the taunt and challenge delivered to her torturers: “ergo age, tortor, adure, seca, divide membra coacta luto” (Prud. *Peri.* 3.91–2).

123. J. Petruccione, “The Portrait of St. Eulalia of Mérida in Prudentius’ *Peristephanon* 3,” *AnBoll* 108 (1990): 81–104, p. 98: “. . . the description of Eulalia’s laceration seems a mixture of the violent with the erotic comparable to, if less explicit than, the speech with which Agnes rushed upon the executioner’s sword (*Pe.* 14.75–79)” ; at p. 98 Petruccione suggests that the wounds on her body forming letters that spell Christ’s name recall the 144,000 in the Apocalypse who had the name of the Lamb written on their foreheads (14.1); it is only fair, however, to point out that these virgins are all *males* who had not allowed themselves to be “defiled by women.”

124. Prud. *Peri.* 3.135–40:

Scriberis ecce mihi, Domine.  
Quam iuvat hos apices legere  
qui tua, Christe, tropaea notant.  
nomen et ipsa sacrum loquitur  
purpura sanguinis eliciti.

125. As in Jerome, the language is heavily erotic. *Dominus* can mean husband or lover; *tropaeum* is used in love poetry for a sexual conquest (e.g., Ovid, *Ep.* 4.66, 9.104, 20.214; *Rem.* 158); and the last verses hint at a lost virginity.

126. C. P. Jones, “*Stigma*: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity,” *JRS* 77 (1987): 139–55.

## LUGDUNUM: WARS MOST PEACEFUL

In the summer of the year c.e. 177 there erupted another one of those typical but terrible pogroms in which the enraged crowds of a local populace, this time of the Gallo-Roman city of Lugdunum (modern-day Lyon), turned on suspected Christians in their midst and demanded that Roman government, personified in the governor, punish the outcasts appropriately.<sup>127</sup> The persecution began with local municipal authorities taking pre-emptive measures to banish the mere sight of Christians from public places—they forbade Christians to visit each others' houses, to frequent the market-place and baths, and, finally, "to be seen in any place whatsoever." The writer, who witnessed the violent actions of the crowd, reports the sequel in which Christians were hauled from their homes, cursed, bound and beaten, dragged, torn and stoned. But, he claims, they were able nobly to endure all these attacks (*gennaiôs hypomenon*). As the observer makes clear in his general assessment of the onslaught, it was because God made the weak strong that the Christians were empowered and acquired the endurance to resist the attack of the Evil One (*dunamenos dia tês hypomonês pasan tên hormên tou ponêrou*).<sup>128</sup> Power is gained through submission.

Both sides acted within a moral economy in which harassments and punishments were traditional and well known. The local populace inflicted on the bodies of the Christians "all the things which the people generally love to inflict on their enemies and hated persons." On their side, the Christians could now summon equally traditional ways in which to meet and to resist the attacks on their bodies. The main appeal in the narrative is to the model of the competitive athlete. In his preamble the author of the letter names the martyrs "athletes of piety" (*eusebeias athlêtôn*)—their manliness and courage (*andreia*) wins battles more important than any war, their trophies are taken from demons, their victories (*nikai*) are over invisible opponents, and crowns (*stephanoî*) are their reward. God will inscribe their names on everlasting monuments.<sup>129</sup> Similarly, the role of the devil is seen as that of an athletic adversary (*ho antikeîmenos*) who has practiced and trained his supporters in athletic and gymnastic skills.<sup>130</sup> In his evaluation of the martyrs who succeeded with-

127. Eusebius, *HE* 5.pr.1.1–2.8.

128. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.6–7.

129. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.1.

130. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.5: ἐθίζων τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ προγυμνάζων κατὰ τῶν δούλων θεοῦ. . . .

standing these attacks on their bodies (as opposed to those who found the sufferings too great), the writer explicitly appeals to athletic models: the bodies of the victorious were ready, trained, and eager whereas the bodies of the losers were untrained, unexercized, and feeble and therefore “not adequately prepared for the great contest.”<sup>131</sup> In the horrendous tortures that followed, it is indeed the body and its ability to resist that counted for everything.

As the arrests continued in both Vienne and Lyon, the house-slaves of the Christians were seized and put to torture. They were not able to resist. After they had witnessed the application of torture with their own eyes, simple fear was sufficient to cause them to surrender. The authorities and the crowd then advanced to attack the Christians themselves. Christians were subject to indescribable tortures so that The Enemy could force the appropriate words from their lips.<sup>132</sup> The torture of Sanctus was an especially good example, since the writer forthrightly states that his body itself was a witness (*to sômaton martys*) to what actually happened, and because the witnessing of Sanctus’s body is explicitly tied to noble endurance (*gennaiôs hypomenôn*). Sanctus’s resistance continued to the point that no raw material was left on which the torturers could work—his body, tortured and twisted out of all human shape, was reduced to “one great wound.” When the torturers began a second assault on his body, thinking that he was no longer capable of endurance, it is Sanctus’s body itself that humiliates them. Despite their repeated attacks on it, his body actually straightens out and regains its former appearance.<sup>133</sup> The purpose of the torture was defeated not only by the corporeal action of the body, but also in verbal enunciation. Sanctus would pronounce none of the identifications of self required by the authorities—no words escaped his lips other than “I am a Christian.”

The reader enters and exits the narrative of the tortures through the body of Blandina. It is with her that the body becomes central. The irony is that her body is doubly weak: that of a woman and that of a slave. She embodied that which men judged to be cheap, ugly, and contemptuous. But she is able to refute these dominant valuations not with her physical

131. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.11: καὶ φανεροὶ καὶ ἕτοιμοι εἰνόντο πρωτομάτυρες, οἳ καὶ μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας ἀνεπλήρου τὴν ὁμολογίαν τῆς μαρτυρίας, ἐφαίνοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀνέτοιμοι καὶ ἀγύμναστοι καὶ ἔτι ἀσθενεῖς, ἀγῶνος μεγάλου τόνον ἐνεργεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι. . . .

132. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.14–15.

133. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.23–24: ὅλον τραῦμα . . . καὶ ἀποβεβληκὸς τὴν ἀνθρώπειον ἕξωθεν μορφήν . . . ἀνωρθώθη τὸ σωματίον ἐν ταῖς μετέπειτα βασάνοις, καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀπέλαβεν τὴν προτέραν. . . .

appearance (*eidōs*) but with her personal power (*dynamis*). The figure of Blandina is counterpoised to her mistress in the flesh (*tēs sarkinas despoinēs autēs*)—the woman who owned Blandina’s body. This slave owner was herself a Christian woman who was caught up in the contest (*mia agōnistria*), but who was in agony (*agōniōsēs*) lest her slave-woman Blandina not be able to hold out because of her bodily weakness (*dia to asthenēs tou sōmatos*). Contrary to the mistress’ assumptions, Blandina is able to endure—no doubt because she could draw upon two intersecting traditional subscripts of bodily resistance, that of women (compare the two stories at the head of this paper) and that of slaves. She is able to do this to such an extent that the effect on the bodies and minds of her torturers is reversed. It is they who become exhausted and wearied, and they who are forced to confess. She therefore wins the contest and is hailed as a noble athlete (*hōs gennaios athlētēs*) no less than a male martyr like Maturus who is labeled a noble contestant (*gennaios agōnistēs*). Blandina’s achievements are contrasted with those of another woman, named Biblis, whose body had been “eaten by the devil” and which was therefore easily broken and unmanly (*anandros*). At the end of this first test, Blandina’s only words are “I am a Christian” (*Christianē eimi*).<sup>134</sup> In his peroration the narrator is insistent that all these witnesses, including the slave woman Blandina, have finally achieved nobility through patience (*tēn eugeneian dia tēs hypomonēs*).

#### BODY AND SOCIETY

In the power struggle between Christians and the Roman state, and in the passions of the martyrs, the consciously elaborated ideology of *hypomonē* took on greater and greater significance, until it came to have a commanding presence in Christian perceptions of the body. The appropriations of experience became ever more insistent, with whole treatises and sermons devoted to the subject (Table 1). On grounds such as these, it has been possible to construct an argument for the body as the critical site of power discourses that flow through it and are inscribed upon it—a substance at the epicenter of the microactions and resistances that constitute and are power. Whatever cautions and caveats that have been issued about the use of such an hypothesis, however, its actual application has naturally tended to constitute the body predominantly in a passive mode. Such an implosive and fragmented construction of power is no small part of the reason why these theorists are reduced to speaking of all other pow-

134. Euseb. *HE* 5.1.17–19: Ἐριστιανή εἶμι.

Table 1. Selected References to καρτερία and ὑπομονή

Author	καρτερία	ὑπομονή	Comments
Septuagint	6	25	All καρτερία refs. are from IV Maccabees
Philo	31	19	
New Testament	0	25	All ὑπομονή refs. are from Pauline texts
Ignatius	0	12	
Gregory of Nyssa	5	24	
Clement of Alexandria	9	47	
Athanasius	10	49	
Eusebius	32	67	
Origen	9	99	
Basil	14	105	
Macarius (Ps.)	0	145	
John Chrysostom	93	550	

Note: For all authors, but notably in the cases from Gregory of Nyssa onward, the count includes all texts in *TLG*, even those that have been attributed to the author on dubious grounds. The caveat is as follows: no particular emphasis is placed on a given author by himself in isolation, but rather on the overall pattern as it develops from the first century b.c.e. to the fourth and fifth centuries c.e. Over this span of time, it would seem that the earlier creators of Christian ideology tended to eschew the vocabulary of *karteria*, whereas those who were writing later out of “more cultivated” milieux, and who were enmeshing the “higher discourses” of Hellenism with Christianity, tended to use both the vocabulary of “strength, power, and aggression” and that of “patience and endurance,” though with an increasing tendency to prefer the latter. The total absence of the language of *karteria* in the Pseudo-Macarius would seem to argue for a later date than the “fourth century” usually attributed to his works. Finally, by “John Chrysostom” is meant the “Chrysostomic corpus,” which therefore necessarily includes later works attributed to that author.

er formations as not much more than hegemonial cumulations of micropower struggles in the body.<sup>135</sup> The evidence and scenes adduced here would nuance this perspective. Since it is indeed the means by which we experience and are imbued with the unspoken assumptions of our culture,

135. In this regard, as in that of the history of sexuality, the “late” Foucault came to change his mind and seemed (albeit in his own inimitable fashion) to accept the problem of more hierarchical structures of power relations, including the critical function of institutions.

it is true that the body itself is a map of memory and bears the imprint of one's own and social remembrance.<sup>136</sup> But it is equally true that this field of personal power meets strong oppositions and resistances in the objective or structural continuities that long outlast, and extend far beyond, the existence of any one body.

It is that longer term duration of new institutional changes that were taking deep root beginning in the first centuries before and during the common era that compelled a newly negotiated view of the body: a civil body under trial and test in a civic régime of power, and one that had to have a place in the new structures of belief. It is found explicated in the fictions of the time—in the romantic tales purveyed by the novelists, the dreamscapes of local notables and sophists, the literary inventions of Stoic philosophers, and the myths of Christian ideologues.<sup>137</sup> It called for the rewriting of old texts which had once highlighted the virtues of political opposition of the community, and the victorious struggle for a new terrestrial order, a new state to be achieved here on earth. The mode of passivity was not so much an autonomous virtue as a necessity, and one that compelled a new centrality of previously subversive values.

The body was indeed the site of a struggle. The spectacular trials and executions of the Christians are but an extreme instance of the use of force to elicit a certain public behaviour from subject bodies, to inscribe one sort of ideology on the body. In this case, it was rejected. Not only did such attempts fail in individual cases—the cumulative effect of individual acts of resistance compelled a final failure in the long term. This observation would suggest that bodies could be self-inscribed with ideologies that ran wholly contrary to those of the dominant power. Individuals could choose to forge and hold ideas about themselves and their bodies independently of the set repertoire presented to them. By appropriating and mutating existing ones, by using the justifications and legitimations of existing ideologies of power as leverage for their own views, and by deciding to place their conceptions in action and priority before those being

136. P. Bourdieu, "The Dialectic of Objectification and Embodiment," (in) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, transl. R. Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 87–95 [*Esquisse d'une théorie de la pratique* (Geneva-Paris: Droz, 1972)]; "Belief and the Body," ch. 4 (in) *The Logic of Practice*, transl. R. Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 66–79 [*Le sens pratique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1980)]; further developed by Paul Connerton, "Bodily Practices," ch. 3 (in) *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 72–102.

137. As emphasized by Goldhill, *Foucault's Virginity*, these texts were largely ignored by Foucault in his construction of sexuality in Graeco-Roman society; and they are not, by any means, the only body of relevant evidence that was not taken into consideration.

forced upon them, humans could create ever new mutations of bodily perception. This could involve a process as radical as a total inversion of the dominant male discourse on the body, the selective appropriation of its values, and the elevation of “feminine” bodily powers as the primary modes of identification and resistance. In the truth of the identity which they wished to assert, an inverted image of the body had become the quintessential weapon of the weak.<sup>138</sup> But those bodies were still finite, mortal, isolated, and weak; and they faced the long-term durability of institutional power. Institutions were containers of a more enduring power, and maintained both a relative and a final control of both violent and coercive force.<sup>139</sup> It was these institutional forces—an organizational apparatus, a program of education, policing functionaries, a body of servitors, pervasive writings and records, an hierarchical membership and officialdom—that remembered, conferred and supported public identities, classified, and, not inconsequentially, made enduring life and death decisions that were successfully enforced.<sup>140</sup> The evidence of this investigation, therefore, points forcefully in the direction of the strong dialectic between individual and structure, in both space and time. The residual problem was that, although the body might well “never lie,” the variant truths embedded in it were often as contradictory and conflict ridden as those in the world outside it. It alone could not subvert institutions or corporate bodies which had their own, much greater, endurance. Only new incorporations could do that. From the perspective of the individual human body, all of this was a terrible hypocrisy. As even the martyrs themselves confessed, their passivity remained a paradox—in order to win, one had to lose.

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138. James C. Scott, “Normal Exploitation, Normal Resistance,” ch. 2 (in) *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1985), 28–47.

139. Crespi, *Social Action and Power*, 109 f., who reinstates some Weberian verities against postmodernist views on the diffusion of power relations.

140. Mary Douglas, *How Institutions Think* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), esp. chs. 5–9.